PLATO: EUTHYPHRO

EDITED BY

T. R. MILLS, M.A. Oxon.

LECTURER IN LATIN AT UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, DUNDEE, EDITOR OF PLATO'S
APOLOGY, AESCHYLUS' EUMENIDES, ETC.

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INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. **Plato**, the *deus philosophorum*, as Cicero calls him, was born at Athens, or possibly Aegina, in the year 428 B.C. His parentage was noble : his father's family traced its line back to Codrus, whilst on his mother's side, Plato claimed descent from Solon. It is said that his real name was Aristocles, and that it was either his fluency of speech or the breadth of his chest which won him the name of *Plato*. He was carefully educated, and was reputed a keen scholar. His life falls naturally into three divisions.

(1) *Period of Discipleship*, 428-399 B.C.—He was at first deeply impressed with the views of Heraclitus, and was drifting, it is said, into scepticism, when in his twentieth year he fell under the influence of Socrates, and, like his brothers Glaucon and Adimantus, sat at the feet of that teacher till the latter's execution in 399 B.C. There is little doubt that this act completed the disgust with which the unsettled state of politics at Athens since 415 B.C. had already inspired Plato, and contributed to turn his thoughts to the excogitation of an ideal state which should be free from the faults of the constitutions which he saw around him.

(2) *Period of Travel and Development*, 399-387 B.C.—On the death of his master he lived for some time at Megara with Euclides, a disciple of Socrates, who dwelt almost exclusively on the logical side of the Socratic teaching. In the course of his wanderings thence he reached Cyrene, and there acquired a dislike to the theory which Aristippus, the head of the *Cyrenaic* School, had wrung from the teaching of Socrates—that, as our feelings are the only thing we can be sure of, pleasure is the end of life. In Magna Graecia he found flourishing two pre-Socratic schools

of thought, both of which influenced his mind very considerably. To the *Pythagoreans* is due not only much of Plato's mysticism, but also of his fondness for mathematics. To the *Eleatics* he was indebted for the conception of the *reality*, τὸ ὄν, underlying that ceaseless *flux*, τὸ γιγνόμενον, which was, in Heraclitus's view, the only form of existence. It was under these influences that Plato conjoined to the ethical ideas he had drawn from Socrates the beginnings of a system of logic, physics and metaphysics, which he gradually blended together into an harmonious whole.

(3) *Period of Professorship at Athens*, 387-347 B.C.— During most of this time he gave free public lectures, both in the garden of his own house at Colonus, and in the Academy, a gymnasium about a mile to the north-west of the city, whence his followers took the name of the *Academic* School, or the *Academy*. These were not exactly formal lectures, but rather conversations like those in which Socrates sought to "bring men's thoughts to the birth by means of question and answer" (cf. *Phaedo*, 75 D). Probably his deeper teaching at home to his more intimate disciples, some twenty-eight in number, took more of the shape of that professorial discourse which his writings, at first pure dialogues, tended more and more to assume. Amongst this inner circle of his disciples were Speusippus, his nephew, who succeeded him as head of the *Academy*, and Aristotle, whom Plato called "the Intellect of his School," and who, after his master's death, founded the School which was called the *Peripatetic*. Plato's residence at Athens was interrupted by two visits to Sicily, which he had seemingly already once visited during the second period of his life. On the first occasion, in 387 B.C., he is said to have been at first kindly received at Syracuse by its despot, Dionysius the Elder, but to have been afterwards sold into slavery, from which he was liberated by Anniceris of Cyrene. He, however, made a great impression on Dion, the brother-in-law of the despot, who, on the death of the Elder Dionysius, in 367 B.C., invited Plato over in the hope that he would train up the despot's son and successor, the Younger Dionysius, upon the model of the philosopher-king of the *Republic*. The experiment, however, was not successful.

Dionysius grew impatient of control, banished Dion, and made it advisable that Plato should withdraw before the expiry of the year. Some years later, 361 B.C., he was induced to return, but was glad to make a hasty escape. Having thus proved to his sorrow the impracticability of his ideal state, "save in the heavens," he continued teaching at Athens till his death, 347 B.C.

§ 2. **The Writings of Plato.** There are extant, besides one book of *Letters* (almost certainly spurious), thirty-five dialogues ascribed to Plato. These have been classified in as many ways as the plays of Shakspere. They may be arranged according to the subject-matter—ethics, physics, and metaphysics; they may be divided into dialogues of search (ζητητικοί), and of exposition (ὑφηγητικοί); or they may be arranged, not exactly in chronological order, but in order of development. The second is the orthodox and time-honoured method : the last the most fruitful. The first must needs be arbitrary, as Plato himself did not either confine or express his thought in any such definite departments—that was left for Aristotle to do, and to do well. To Plato philosophy was one and indivisible : Aristotle, while accepting its unity, broke it up, for convenience of treatment, into the still recognised parts. Aristotle handled apart both LOGIC, and thereafter in succession those sciences for the study of which Logic provides principles and methods. His classification of these sciences may be shown thus :—

PHILOSOPHY.

SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY (whose aim is truth) (θεωρητική).	PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY (whose aim is action) (πρακτική).	POETIC PHILOSOPHY (whose end is artistic production) (ποιητική).
"METAPHYSICS" (πρώτη φιλοσοφία, θεολογία.	MATHEMATICS. PHYSICS (including PSYCHOLOGY).	POETICS. RHETORIC (?)
ETHICS.	OECONOMICS.	POLITICS.

Doubtless many of Plato's works might be assigned to one or other of these divisions; but the more important it would be very difficult to locate. The *Republic*, for instance, may be mainly political, but it treats, not merely touches, every single one of the foregoing sciences. So, too, with the *Phaedo*, the *Laws*, etc.

(1) Accepting, then, the third method of classification, we find, corresponding to the first period of Plato's life, certain *Socratic Dialogues*, in which, with a view to learning what a given thing is, various opinions concerning it are compared, the accidentals are eliminated, and ultimately, in some cases, a general concept (ἔννοια) is arrived at. It is thus that the *Laches* deals with Courage, the *Charmides* with Temperance, the first book of the *Republic* with Justice, the *Lysis* with Friendship, the *Euthyphro* with Piety, the *Protagoras* with Virtue, etc. All these are Socratic, both in subject and in method, *i.e.*, they deal with ethics, and they prove to the interlocutors, by means of question and answer (or "dialectic"), that they know neither what they are talking about, nor what they should and can know.

(2) Influenced by the various thinkers whom he met in the second period of his life, Plato went a step further by regarding these general conceptions not merely as thoughts in the mind, but as ἰδέαι, *Ideas*, having an existence of their own. The ideas are separable (χωριστά) from things (φαινόμενα), which are, in fact, what they are, because of the ideas. He never quite explains the *how* of it: at first the ideas are present or immanent in things, and things participate in the ideas (παρουσία, μέθεξις); later the ideas are the exemplars or archetypes which things imitate (παραδείγματα, μίμησις). Only ideas can be *known:* things can only be seen, heard, felt, etc. This is because things *seem*, ideas *are*. Heraclitus is, in fact, right, so far as he goes: the phenomenal world is in a state of ceaseless flux and change (πάντα ῥεῖ), and the senses whereby we perceive it are equally unstable. But over and above this, there is an ideal world apprehended, not by the senses, but by the soul, which must be eternal, even as the ideas it comprehends. This ideal world is not continually changing (γίγνεται), but really exists (ἔστι). True, Parmenides was

wrong in thinking all that *really* exists to be one and the same (τὸ ὄν *equivalent to* τὸ ἕν), but he was right thus far at least : there are many realities, existences (οὐσίαι), for there are many ἰδέαι; but they are all subordinate to the one supreme reality, the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Thus *Ethics*, closely interwoven with *Politics*, finds an abiding basis in *Metaphysics* (the knowledge of what really is), and is bound up closely with *Dialectic* (the instrument whereby its truths are discovered), and with *Psychology* which deals with the nature and function of the human soul—the only home of those truths.

All this is elaborated in the second and in the early part of the third period of Plato's life in Dialogues of the middle stage of Plato's thought. Amongst these Dialogues—the precise order is fertile matter for speculation—come the *Symposium*, treating of the lofty philosophic ἔρως, which impels to the pursuit of true beauty and beauteous truth ; the *Meno*, which elaborates the theory that *knowledge* (ἐπιστήμη, not mere δόξα, *seeming*) is the reminiscence (ἀνάμνησις) of what the soul knew in a pre-existent state ; the *Phaedo*, which asserts that the soul exists not only before birth, as is shown in the *Phaedrus*, but after death—thus, in fact, it is eternal ; the *Gorgias*, which treats of pleasure, both on its ethical and on its psychological side ; and the *Republic* —"that unsurpassable monument of genius," which, purporting to discover what justice is, tells us, as it were by the way, how states rise, wax and wane, works out a magnificent theory of education, and almost exhausts the analogy of state and individual.

(3) Answering to the third period of Plato's life, but in strict chronology covering only his later years, are the Dialogues from which his Syracusan experiences have taken away that high hope of the betterment of things with which he started, and in which the mysticism of Pythagoras becomes more pronounced. Of these the chief are the *Timaeus*, containing a physical theory of the universe in which the agency of the ideas is more exactly depicted than elsewhere, and the *Laws*, which retraces, in a somewhat more conservative spirit, the ground already covered in the *Republic*.

§ 3. **The Early Philosophers and the Sophists.**—The question which the pre-Socratic philosophers tried to answer was, What is the universal principle from which the whole of nature originated? From the days of Thales of Miletus (640-550 B.C.) the answers given to it by the thinkers of Ionia, Magna Graecia, and Sicily were of the most conflicting nature. The Ionic physicists gave various materialistic explanations of the universe; *e.g.* Thales considered that the first cause of all things was water, Heracleitus that it was fire. On the other hand, the Eleatic school in Italy, the most famous names in which are Parmenides and Zeno, regarded the only real existence as infinite, indivisible, and imperishable being apprehended by thought, and considered the phenomenal world apprehended by the senses as an illusion. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (500-428 B.C.) made a great step in advance by asserting that Reason was the efficient cause of the universe. He maintained that each substance was composed of an infinite number of particles mainly like in nature to the whole of which they formed part (ὁμοιομερῆ), and that these particles, originally in a state of chaos (δίνη), were arranged into a κόσμος by νοῦς, an infinite and self-existent principle of Reason. Anaxagoras, who came to Athens about 460 B.C., and was an intimate friend of Pericles, shared his unpopularity, and was driven from Athens on a charge of impiety before the Peloponnesian war broke out.

The utter want of agreement among early "physicists" produced a reaction against the study of nature, and the age of the Sophists began. The name σοφιστής, which originally meant merely a clever man, and could be applied to a poet or legislator, was specially applied, in the fifth century B.C., to a class of popular teachers who claimed to prepare men for civic life, and to meet the want produced by the growth of the power of the people. Birth or wealth were no longer adequate to ensure the success of a public man; the power of persuading the popular Assembly was all-important, and the Sophists provided an education in rhetoric and general culture, including morals. Few of them were Athenians; and though they

centred chiefly in Athens, where there was a keen demand for the training they could give, they moved about through the various towns of Greece.

The earliest of the Sophists was Protagoras of Abdera, born about 485 B.C., and best known for his dictum, "Man is the measure of all things," *i.e.* knowledge is relative to the individual subject, and truth is different for any two individuals. Among the most famous of the later Sophists were Gorgias of Leontini in Sicily, Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis. Gorgias came to Athens as an ambassador in 427 B.C., and afterwards attained fame and wealth by lecturing there on rhetoric. His attitude to the early physicists was enunciated in three propositions : (*a*) the substance for which they sought did not exist ; (*b*) even if it did exist it could not be known ; (*c*) if it were known, the knowledge of it could not be communicated. Prodicus, with whom Socrates himself was intimate, was well-known for his investigations into synonyms, and is still remembered for his apologue on the choice of Heracles. Hippias was famous for the wide range of his knowledge, which embraced all the existing sciences. On a far lower level stood the Eristic Sophists, who taught the art of disputation not as a means of discovering truth, but solely as a way of gaining the victory over an opponent. It is this later development which Plato specially attacks ; Protagoras he regards with admiration, Gorgias with respect.

§ 4. **The Life of Socrates.**—Socrates was born in the deme of Alopece, close to Athens, about 469 B.C., his father Sophroniscus being a sculptor, and his mother Phaenarete a midwife. Of his early days little is known, but he evidently profited by the lectures and conversation of the contemporary philosophers. Unique alike in physical and intellectual qualities, he soon became a well-known character in Athens. "Short of stature, thick-necked, and somewhat corpulent, with prominent eyes, with nose upturned and nostrils outspread, with large mouth and coarse lips, he seemed the embodiment of sensuality and even stupidity."* His constitution was robust, and he

* "Socrates," *Encycl. Brit.*; Dr. H. Jackson.

went barefoot at all seasons of the year, wearing the same
clothing both in summer and winter. He served with
courage and distinction in several campaigns, being
present at the siege of Potidaea (432-429 B.C), and at the
battles of Delium (424 B.C.) and of Amphipolis (422 B.C.).
His upright and fearless character was strikingly shown on
three important occasions. As President of the Prytanes
during the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae,
406 B.C., he persisted in refusing to put to the vote a
motion in favour of a grossly illegal method of procedure.
Again, in 404 B.C., when ordered by the Thirty Tyrants
to go to Salamis to bring Leon, one of their victims,
for execution, he absolutely declined to take part in
the disgraceful act. Finally, in 399 B.C., he showed the
same high courage when death stared him in the face.

§ 5. The Teaching of Socrates.—For information on this
subject we are in the main dependent on three contem-
poraries of Socrates—Plato, Xenophon, and Aristophanes.
The pictures given by the two former supplement one
another, Plato dwelling on the more purely speculative
side of Socrates' teaching, Xenophon on his influence as
a moral reformer. Aristophanes, on the other hand,
unfairly identifying Socrates with the ordinary Sophists,
takes him as a type of the modern influences which, in the
conservative view of the poet, were ruining the old insti-
tutions of Athens. In the play of the *Clouds*, acted in
423 B.C., Socrates is introduced as a pale-faced impostor,
an atheist, a student of physical science, and a rhetorician
who teaches how to make the worse cause appear the
better. The reasons why Aristophanes took Socrates for
the butt of his jests are not far to seek; his personal
appearance lent itself to caricature, and he was the only
teacher whose physiognomy was familiar to all Athenians.
Whereas ordinary Sophists taught only pupils who paid for
instruction, Socrates spent the whole day in public, con-
versing in the market-place and the gymnasia with persons
of all ranks and ages and in the hearing of all who chose
to listen.

Socrates resembled the Sophists in unsettling the con-
ventional notions of the day, and in the belief that know-

ledge was essential to the right ordering of life. But whereas the tendency of the teaching of many of the Sophists was purely destructive, that of Socrates was also constructive. Like the Sophists, he held aloof from enquiries into the secret of the universe, partly because the contradictory results arrived at by the early physicists seemed to indicate that such enquiries were futile, and partly because he held that they were impious. He took for his subject the moral nature of man, and was in one aspect a philosopher with a reasoned theory of ethics; in another and more important aspect he was a moral reformer, performing a divine mission.

Starting with two propositions which were readily admitted—(1) Everyone really desires his own good, and (2) Virtue is the highest good—he drew the conclusion that if a man did not possess virtue, it must be because he was ignorant of what constituted virtue. Knowledge in this way became synonymous with virtue, and vice with ignorance. In order to live a good life, a man must know the nature of justice, courage, piety, and the other good qualities which were embraced under the general name of virtue. The contemporaries of Socrates were confident enough that they understood what these words meant; his first step was to show that their confidence was misplaced,—to act as physician of the soul, and to purge it from error.

The method he adopted was that of question and answer—the famous διαλεκτική, which had indeed been employed with success by the Eleatic Zeno, but which in Socrates' hands achieved its chief fame. Starting with some popular definition the truth of which his interlocutor readily admitted, he would lead him, by his skilful questioning, to deduce from it consequences which were manifestly inconsistent with known facts, and thus disprove the proposition with which he started.

Such was the Socratic ἔλεγχος ("cross-examination"), which reduced the interlocutor to a state of perplexity, in which often he was content to remain, without trying to make any further advance. During the whole process, Socrates pretended to be entirely ignorant, and to be

trying to gain from others the knowledge that was wanting in himself.

Having thus cleared away the chief obstacle from the path to knowledge, Socrates now applied his positive or constructive method. To those of his hearers who did not leave him through personal pique he put suggestive questions tending to draw out what was in them, and thus associated them with himself in the search for knowledge. This process of educing men's latent thoughts he metaphorically designated as μαιευτική, "bringing to the birth." In this way it was possible to arrive at true conceptions of justice, temperance, etc., by which a man would be able to regulate his conduct, aiming at good objects and avoiding bad. Since the definitions were arrived at by comparing specific instances, *e.g.* of justice, and ascertaining what was the element common to all, Aristotle can say that Socrates rendered two great services to philosophy, by introducing induction and definition.

It can readily be seen that such a method would be sure to arouse considerable animosity on the part of people whose ignorance Socrates rendered patent to themselves and to others. In 399 B.C. he was indicted on a charge of impiety, the prosecutors being Meletus and two others. Socrates in his defence adopted an uncompromising tone, and would not flatter or entreat the jury. He was found guilty and sentenced to drink the hemlock. For thirty days he remained in prison, where his friends had free access to him, and he died serenely when the appointed time arrived.

§ 6. **Analysis of the "Euthyphro."**—Ch. I.V-. Euthyphro is surprised to meet Socrates in the precincts of a law-court. The reason is that Meletus has indicted Socrates for impiety. Euthyphro does not believe the charge, and proceeds to explain what has brought him to court; he has commenced a prosecution of his own father for murder. The victim, a labourer in the service of Euthyphro's father in Naxos, had killed one of the slaves in a fit of drunken rage; his master had bound him hand and foot and thrown him into a ditch, while he sent to Athens to ask the authorities what he should do; but before the

answer arrived, the man had died. Euthyphro considers that he is bound to prosecute his father. Socrates, having enquired whether Euthyphro is quite sure that his action is not impious, and received an emphatic answer in the affirmative, suggests that he cannot do better than become a pupil of Euthyphro, in order that he may be able to meet the charge brought by Meletus. Accordingly he asks for a definition of piety and impiety.

Ch. VI. The reply of Euthyphro is not a definition, but merely an enumeration of particular acts which are, in his view, pious. "Holiness is what I am doing now ; it is to prosecute the wrongdoer, whose offence is either bloodshed or sacrilege or anything else of the kind, whether he be one's father or mother or anyone else ; and to neglect to prosecute is unholy." In support of this position Euthyphro appeals to the conduct of Zeus and Cronus towards their respective parents.

Ch. VII.-X. When the inadequacy of his first attempt at a definition has been pointed out, he makes a second effort : "What is dear to the gods is holy, and what is not dear to them is unholy." But he is forced to admit that the gods differ on questions of right and wrong ; consequently the same act may be both loved and hated by gods, *i.e.* both holy and unholy. But, while admitting this, he thinks the gods are agreed that a murderer deserves punishment. Socrates assents, but points out that disagreement arises not as to this general truth, but as to whether a particular act falls under the category of murder. He goes on to ask for a proof that the gods are agreed in thinking that Euthyphro's father has committed murder ; but Euthyphro shirks answering, and Socrates thinks it unnecessary to press the question.

Ch. XI.-XIII. He now suggests an amendment of the definition, which Euthyphro accepts :—"Whatever *all* the gods love is holy, whatever they *all* hate is unholy." But even this is shown to be unsatisfactory by the following line of argument. A state is the result of a series of acts ; consequently a thing is in the state of being-loved because it is loved. But it is not true to say that holiness is holy because it is loved ; on the contrary, it is loved because it

is holy. Consequently, "holiness" and "what-is-loved-by-gods" are not convertible terms. The quality of "being loved by gods" is, in fact, only an attribute of holiness, not its essence.

Ch. XIII.-XVI. To stimulate Euthyphro, who shows an inclination to stand on his dignity, Socrates suggests a step towards a fresh definition. Is it not possible that holiness may be a part of rectitude (δικαιοσύνη, not "justice" as a separate virtue, but the sum total of right conduct)? Euthyphro does not immediately grasp the distinction between the propositions "All that is holy is right" and "All that is right is holy." An illustration makes it clear to him, and he admits that holiness is a part of rectitude. When asked *what* part it is, he gives his fourth definition : "That part of rectitude is pious and holy which is concerned with care for the gods." Socrates points out that the term "care" requires elucidation; Euthyphro asserts that it is analogous to the care of slaves for their masters, in fact a form of "service." But all service is serviceable for the production of some result : what then, asks Socrates, is the result which the gods produce with the aid of man's service?

Ch. XVI.-XX. Instead of answering, Euthyphro propounds a fifth definition : "Holiness is the doing and saying of things acceptable to the gods when one is sacrificing and praying." But this comes to the same thing as saying that holiness is what is loved by the gods, a position already refuted. Socrates wishes to begin afresh ; but Euthyphro cannot stay any longer, and Socrates parts from him with an expression of disappointment at his failure to equip himself for the contest with Meletus.

§ 7. **Purport of the "Euthyphro."**—The main object of the dialogue is to discuss and refute some of the current notions on the subject of piety. They are appropriately put in the mouth of a soothsayer who is an expert in matters religious. Like the other early dialogues, the *Euthyphro* is essentially destructive. No decision is arrived at, and we have only a hint as to the direction in which Socrates conceived that the true answer would be found.

In Ch. XVII. he complains that Euthyphro has avoided coming to the point when he was close upon it, adding that if he had answered the question, "What is that all-glorious result which the gods produce when they use us as servants?" he would have given a satisfactory definition of piety. There can be but little doubt that the answer Socrates had in view was "right conduct." Piety, then, would not be a specific virtue, standing on the same plane as courage, temperance, and the like; it would embrace the whole field of virtuous action, regarded as a joint work of men and the gods, man being the instrument of the divine will.

Apart from the main theme of the dialogue, there is an implied defence of the attitude of Socrates towards religion. When Euthyphro, a believer in the popular mythology, prosecutes his father just as Zeus and Cronus had maltreated their respective fathers, his conduct is such as to shock the natural feelings of humanity. Accordingly it is clear that the orthodox view, if rigidly applied in practice, strikes a blow at family ties—the very result that Socrates was blamed for producing; for we learn from Xenophon's *Memorabilia* that the charge of corrupting the young was supported on the ground that he taught the young disrespect for their parents and kinsmen, by urging that men should seek their friends only among those who could be of use to them.

§ 8. Of **Euthyphro** very little is known. From the dialogue which bears his name we learn only that he was a soothsayer, that he had been a landholder in Naxos, and that he had taken proceedings against his father for the murder of a labourer. In the *Cratylus* he is mentioned several times as an enthusiast in etymology, in which Socrates ironically credits him with "wonderful cleverness"; he is called a native of Prospalta, one of the townships of Attica.

§ 9. **Scene and Date of the "Euthyphro."**—The dialogue is supposed to take place in the market-place of Athens, near the court of the king-archon, in 399 B.C., after Meletus has commenced the prosecution of Socrates. For the date of composition there is no external evidence;

but most authorities are agreed in considering it one of Plato's early works.

Note.—The Text of this edition is based on that of Schanz. In the preparation of the Notes the commentaries of Schanz and Adam have been consulted. For the first two sections of the Introduction the editor is indebted to the University Tutorial Press edition of the *Phaedo*.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ
ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ.

2   Ι. Τί νεώτερον, ὦ Σώκρατες, γέγονεν, ὅτι σὺ τὰς ἐν 1
Λυκείῳ καταλιπὼν διατριβὰς ἐνθάδε νῦν διατρίβεις
περὶ τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοάν ; οὐ γάρ που καὶ σοί γε
δίκη τις οὖσα τυγχάνει πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα ὥσπερ ἐμοί.

    ΣΩ. Οὔτοι δὴ Ἀθηναῖοί γε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, δίκην αὐ- 5
τὴν καλοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ γραφήν.

B   ΕΥΘ. Τί φής ; γραφήν σέ τις, ὡς ἔοικε, γέγραπται ;
οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνό γε καταγνώσομαι, ὡς σὺ ἕτερον.

    ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

    ΕΥΘ. Ἀλλὰ σὲ ἄλλος ;   10

    ΣΩ. Πάνυ γε.

    ΕΥΘ. Τίς οὗτος ;

    ΣΩ. Οὐδ' αὐτὸς πάνυ τι γιγνώσκω, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τὸν
ἄνδρα· νέος γάρ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἀγνώς· ὀνομάζουσι
μέντοι αὐτόν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, Μέλητον. ἔστι δὲ τῶν δήμων 15
Πιτθεύς, εἴ τινα νῷ ἔχεις Πιτθέα Μέλητον, οἷον τετα-
νότριχα καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐγένειον, ἐπίγρυπον δέ.

1 ΕΥΘ. Οὐκ ἐννοῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ δὴ τίνα γραφήν 2
σε γέγραπται ;
C

20 ΣΩ. Ἥντινα ; οὐκ ἀγεννῆ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ· τὸ γὰρ νέον
ὄντα τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα ἐγνωκέναι οὐ φαῦλόν ἐστιν·
ἐκεῖνος γάρ, ὥς φησιν, οἶδε, τίνα τρόπον οἱ νέοι δια-
φθείρονται καὶ τίνες οἱ διαφθείροντες αὐτούς. καὶ
κινδυνεύει σοφός τις εἶναι· καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀμαθίαν
κατιδὼν ὡς διαφθείροντος τοὺς ἡλικιώτας αὐτοῦ,
ἔρχεται κατηγορήσων μου ὡς πρὸς μητέρα πρὸς τὴν
πόλιν. καὶ φαίνεταί μοι τῶν πολιτικῶν μόνος ἄρχεσ-
θαι ὀρθῶς· ὀρθῶς γάρ ἐστι τῶν νέων πρῶτον ἐπι- D
μεληθῆναι, ὅπως ἔσονται ὅ τι ἄριστοι, ὥσπερ γεωργὸν
30 ἀγαθὸν τῶν νέων φυτῶν εἰκὸς πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθῆναι,
μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ δὴ καὶ Μέλητος
ἴσως πρῶτον μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐκκαθαίρει τοὺς τῶν νέων τὰς 3
βλάστας διαφθείροντας, ὥς φησιν· ἔπειτα μετὰ τοῦτο
δῆλον ὅτι τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἐπιμεληθεὶς πλείστων καὶ
35 μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος τῇ πόλει γενήσεται, ὥς γε τὸ
εἰκὸς ξυμβῆναι ἐκ τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἀρξαμένῳ.

2 II. ΕΥΘ. Βουλοίμην ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ᾿ ὀρρωδῶ,
μὴ τοὐναντίον γένηται. ἀτεχνῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀφ᾿
Ἑστίας ἄρχεσθαι κακουργεῖν τὴν πόλιν, ἐπιχειρῶν
ἀδικεῖν σέ. καί μοι λέγε, τί καὶ ποιοῦντά σέ φησι
5 διαφθείρειν τοὺς νέους ;

ΣΩ. Ἄτοπα, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὡς οὕτω γ᾿ ἀκοῦσαι. φησὶ B
γάρ με ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν, καὶ ὡς καινοὺς ποιοῦντα
θεούς, τοὺς δ᾿ ἀρχαίους οὐ νομίζοντα, ἐγράψατο τούτων
αὐτῶν ἕνεκα, ὥς φησιν.

10 ΕΥΘ. Μανθάνω, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὅτι δὴ σὺ τὸ δαιμό-
νιον φῂς σαυτῷ ἑκάστοτε γίγνεσθαι. ὡς οὖν καινοτο-
μοῦντός σου περὶ τὰ θεῖα γέγραπται ταύτην τὴν γραφήν,

3 καὶ ὡς διαβαλῶν δὴ ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, εἰδὼς 2
ὅτι εὐδιάβολα τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς. καὶ
c ἐμοῦ γάρ τοι, ὅταν τι λέγω ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ περὶ τῶν 15
θείων, προλέγων αὐτοῖς τὰ μέλλοντα, καταγελῶσιν ὡς
μαινομένου. καίτοι οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἴρηκα ὧν
προεῖπον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως φθονοῦσιν ἡμῖν πᾶσι τοῖς τοιού-
τοις. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν αὐτῶν χρὴ φροντίζειν, ἀλλ᾽ ὁμόσε
ἰέναι. 20

III. ΣΩ. Ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καταγελα- 3
σθῆναι ἴσως οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα. Ἀθηναίοις γάρ τοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ
δοκεῖ, οὐ σφόδρα μέλει, ἄν τινα δεινὸν οἴωνται εἶναι, μὴ
μέντοι διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὑτοῦ σοφίας· ὃν δ᾽ ἂν καὶ
D ἄλλους οἴωνται ποιεῖν τοιούτους, θυμοῦνται, εἴτ᾽ οὖν 5
φθόνῳ, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, εἴτε δι᾽ ἄλλο τι.

ΕΥΘ. Τούτου οὖν πέρι ὅπως ποτὲ πρὸς ἐμὲ ἔχουσιν,
οὐ πάνυ ἐπιθυμῶ πειραθῆναι.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως γὰρ σὺ μὲν δοκεῖς σπάνιον σεαυτὸν παρέ-
χειν καὶ διδάσκειν οὐκ ἐθέλειν τὴν σεαυτοῦ σοφίαν· ἐγὼ 10
δὲ φοβοῦμαι μὴ ὑπὸ φιλανθρωπίας δοκῶ αὐτοῖς ὅ τί
περ ἔχω ἐκκεχυμένως παντὶ ἀνδρὶ λέγειν, οὐ μόνον ἄνευ
μισθοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθεὶς ἂν ἡδέως, εἴ τίς μου ἐθέλοι
ἀκούειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, μέλλοιέν μου κατα-
E γελᾶν, ὥσπερ σὺ φῂς σαυτοῦ, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ἀηδὲς παί- 15
ζοντας καὶ γελῶντας ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ διαγαγεῖν, εἰ δὲ
σπουδάσονται, τοῦτ᾽ ἤδη ὅπῃ ἀποβήσεται ἄδηλον πλὴν
ὑμῖν τοῖς μάντεσιν.

ΕΥΘ. Ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως οὐδὲν ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρᾶγμα,
ἀλλὰ σύ τε κατὰ νοῦν ἀγωνιεῖ τὴν δίκην, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ 20
ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμήν.

IV. ΣΩ. Ἔστιν δὲ δή σοι, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τίς ἡ δίκη ; 4
φεύγεις αὐτὴν ἢ διώκεις ;

4 ΕΥΘ. Διώκω.

ΣΩ. Τίνα ;

5 ΕΥΘ. Ὃν διώκων αὖ δοκῶ μαίνεσθαι. 4

ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; πετόμενόν τινα διώκεις ;

ΕΥΘ. Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ πέτεσθαι, ὅς γε τυγχάνει ὢν εὖ μάλα πρεσβύτης.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὗτος ;

10 ΕΥΘ. Ὁ ἐμὸς πατήρ.

ΣΩ. Ὁ σός, ὦ βέλτιστε ;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν δὲ τί τὸ ἔγκλημα καὶ τίνος ἡ δίκη ;

ΕΥΘ. Φόνου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

15 ΣΩ. Ἡράκλεις· ἦ που, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ἀγνοεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὀρθῶς ἔχει * * *. οὐ γὰρ οἶμαί γε τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ πρᾶξαι, ἀλλὰ πόρρω που Β ἤδη σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος.

ΕΥΘ. Πόρρω μέντοι νὴ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες.

20 ΣΩ. Ἔστιν δὲ δὴ τῶν οἰκείων τις ὁ τεθνεὼς ὑπὸ τοῦ σοῦ πατρός ; ἢ δῆλα δή ; οὐ γὰρ ἄν που ὑπέρ γε ἀλλοτρίου ἐπεξῄεισθα φόνου αὐτῷ.

ΕΥΘ. Γελοῖον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οἴει τι διαφέρειν, εἴτε ἀλλότριος εἴτε οἰκεῖος ὁ τεθνεώς, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τοῦτο μό-
25 νον δεῖν φυλάττειν, εἴτε ἐν δίκῃ ἔκτεινεν ὁ κτείνας εἴτε μή, καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐν δίκῃ, ἐᾶν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπεξιέναι, ἐάνπερ ὁ κτείνας συνέστιός σοι καὶ ὁμοτράπεζος ᾖ. ἴσον γὰρ C τὸ μίασμα γίγνεται, ἐὰν ξυνῇς τῷ τοιούτῳ ξυνειδὼς καὶ μὴ ἀφοσιοῖς σεαυτόν τε καὶ ἐκεῖνον τῇ δίκῃ ἐπεξιών.
30 ἐπεὶ ὅ γε ἀποθανὼν πελάτης τις ἦν ἐμός, καὶ ὡς ἐγεωργοῦμεν ἐν τῇ Νάξῳ, ἐθήτευεν ἐκεῖ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν. παροινήσας οὖν καὶ ὀργισθεὶς τῶν οἰκετῶν τινι τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀποσφάττει αὐτόν· ὁ οὖν πατὴρ συνδήσας τοὺς πόδας καὶ

4 τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ, καταβαλὼν εἰς τάφρον τινά, πέμπει 4
δεῦρο ἄνδρα πευσόμενον τοῦ ἐξηγητοῦ ὅ τι χρείη ποιεῖν. 35
D ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ τοῦ δεδεμένου ὠλιγώρει τε καὶ
ἠμέλει ὡς ἀνδροφόνου καὶ οὐδὲν ὃν πρᾶγμα, εἰ καὶ ἀπο-
θάνοι· ὅπερ οὖν καὶ ἔπαθεν. ὑπὸ γὰρ λιμοῦ καὶ ῥίγους
καὶ τῶν δεσμῶν ἀποθνῄσκει, πρὶν τὸν ἄγγελον παρὰ τοῦ
ἐξηγητοῦ ἀφικέσθαι. ταῦτα δὴ οὖν καὶ ἀγανάκτει ὅ τε 40
πατὴρ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἰκεῖοι, ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀνδροφό-
νου τῷ πατρὶ φόνου ἐπεξέρχομαι, οὔτε ἀποκτείναντι, ὥς
φασιν ἐκεῖνοι, οὔτ᾽ εἰ ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀπέκτεινεν, ἀνδροφό-
νου γε ὄντος τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, οὐ δεῖν φροντίζειν ὑπὲρ
E τοῦ τοιούτου· ἀνόσιον γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ὑὸν πατρὶ φόνου 45
ἐπεξιέναι· κακῶς εἰδότες, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ θεῖον ὡς ἔχει
τοῦ ὁσίου τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσίου.

ΣΩ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ πρὸς Διός, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, οὑτωσὶ ἀκρι-
βῶς οἴει ἐπίστασθαι περὶ τῶν θείων, ὅπη ἔχει, καὶ τῶν
ὁσίων τε καὶ ἀνοσίων, ὥστε τούτων οὕτω πραχθέντων, 50
ὡς σὺ λέγεις, οὐ φοβεῖ δικαζόμενος τῷ πατρί, ὅπως μὴ
αὖ σὺ ἀνόσιον πρᾶγμα τυγχάνῃς πράττων ;

ΕΥΘ. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄν μου ὄφελος εἴη, ὦ Σώκρατες,
5 οὐδέ τῳ ἂν διαφέροι Εὐθύφρων τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων,
εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ἀκριβῶς εἰδείην. 55

V. ΣΩ. Ἆρ᾽ οὖν μοι, ὦ θαυμάσιε Εὐθύφρον, κράτισ- 5
τόν ἐστι μαθητῇ σῷ γενέσθαι καὶ πρὸ τῆς γραφῆς τῆς
πρὸς Μέλητον αὐτὰ ταῦτα προκαλεῖσθαι αὐτὸν λέγοντα,
ὅτι ἔγωγε καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ τὰ θεῖα περὶ
πολλοῦ ἐποιούμην εἰδέναι, καὶ νῦν ἐπειδή με ἐκεῖνος 5
αὐτοσχεδιάζοντά φησι καὶ καινοτομοῦντα περὶ τῶν
θείων ἐξαμαρτάνειν, μαθητὴς δὴ γέγονα σός—καὶ εἰ
B μέν, ὦ Μέλητε, φαίην ἄν, Εὐθύφρονα ὁμολογεῖς σοφὸν
εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ ὀρθῶς νομίζειν ἐμὲ ἡγοῦ καὶ μὴ

5 δικάζου· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐκείνῳ τῷ διδασκάλῳ λάχε δίκην πρό- 5
11 τερον ἢ ἐμοί, ὡς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους διαφθείροντι, ἐμέ τε
καὶ τὸν αὑτοῦ πατέρα, ἐμὲ μὲν διδάσκοντι, ἐκεῖνον δὲ νου-
θετοῦντί τε καὶ κολάζοντι—καὶ ἂν μή μοι πείθηται μηδὲ
ἀφίῃ τῆς δίκης ἢ ἀντ' ἐμοῦ γράφηται σέ, αὐτὰ ταῦτα
15 λέγειν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἃ προὐκαλούμην αὐτόν.

ΕΥΘ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἄρα με ἐπιχειρή-
σειε γράφεσθαι, εὕροιμ' ἄν, ὡς οἶμαι, ὅπη σαθρός ἐστιν, c
καὶ πολὺ ἂν ἡμῖν πρότερον περὶ ἐκείνου λόγος ἐγένετο
ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἢ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

20 ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐγώ τοι, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, ταῦτα γιγνώσκων
μαθητὴς ἐπιθυμῶ γενέσθαι σός, εἰδὼς ὅτι καὶ ἄλλος
πού τις καὶ ὁ Μέλητος οὗτος σὲ μὲν οὐδὲ δοκεῖ ὁρᾶν,
ἐμὲ δὲ οὕτως ὀξέως καὶ ῥᾳδίως κατεῖδεν, ὥστε ἀσεβείας
ἐγράψατο. νῦν οὖν πρὸς Διὸς λέγε μοι, ὃ νῦν δὴ σαφῶς
25 εἰδέναι διισχυρίζου· ποῖόν τι τὸ εὐσεβὲς φὴς εἶναι καὶ
τὸ ἀσεβὲς καὶ περὶ φόνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων; ἢ οὐ ᴅ
ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἐν πάσῃ πράξει τὸ ὅσιον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, καὶ
τὸ ἀνόσιον αὖ τοῦ μὲν ὁσίου παντὸς ἐναντίον, αὐτὸ δὲ
αὑτῷ ὅμοιον καὶ ἔχον μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιό-
30 τητα πᾶν, ὅ τί περ ἂν μέλλῃ ἀνόσιον εἶναι;

ΕΥΘ. Πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

6 VI. ΣΩ. Λέγε δή, τί φὴς εἶναι τὸ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ
ἀνόσιον;

ΕΥΘ. Λέγω τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὅσιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ
ἐγὼ νῦν ποιῶ, τῷ ἀδικοῦντι ἢ περὶ φόνους ἢ περὶ
5 ἱερῶν κλοπὰς ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων ἐξαμαρτάνοντι
ἐπεξιέναι, ἐάν τε πατὴρ ὢν τυγχάνῃ ἐάν τε μήτηρ
ἐάν τε ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐπεξιέναι ἀνόσιον· ꜰ
ἐπεί, ὦ Σώκρατες, θέασαι, ὡς μέγα σοι ἐρῶ τεκμήριον
τοῦ νόμου ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, ὃ καὶ ἄλλοις ἤδη εἶπον,

5 ὅτι ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη οὕτω γιγνόμενα, μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν 6
τῷ ἀσεβοῦντι μηδ᾽ ἂν ὁστισοῦν τυγχάνῃ ὤν· αὐτοὶ 11
γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τυγχάνουσι νομίζοντες τὸν Δία τῶν
θεῶν ἄριστον καὶ δικαιότατον, καὶ τοῦτοι ὁμολογοῦσι
6 τὸν αὑτοῦ πατέρα δῆσαι, ὅτι τοὺς υἱεῖς κατέπινεν οὐκ
ἐν δίκῃ, κἀκεῖνόν γε αὖ τὸν αὑτοῦ πατέρα ἐκτεμεῖν δι᾽ 15
ἕτερα τοιαῦτα· ἐμοὶ δὲ χαλεπαίνουσιν, ὅτι τῷ πατρὶ
ἐπεξέρχομαι ἀδικοῦντι, καὶ οὕτως αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς τὰ
ἐναντία λέγουσι περί τε τῶν θεῶν καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩ. Ἆρά γε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστίν, οὕνεκα τὴν
γραφὴν φεύγω, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπειδάν τις περὶ τῶν 20
θεῶν λέγῃ, δυσχερῶς πως ἀποδέχομαι ; διὸ δή, ὡς
ἔοικεν, φήσει τίς με ἐξαμαρτάνειν· νῦν οὖν εἰ καὶ σοὶ
B ταῦτα ξυνδοκεῖ τῷ εὖ εἰδότι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀνάγκη
δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ ἡμῖν ξυγχωρεῖν. τί γὰρ καὶ φήσομεν,
οἵ γε αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδὲν εἰδέναι ; 25
ἀλλά μοι εἰπὲ πρὸς φιλίου, σὺ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡγεῖ ταῦτα
οὕτως γεγονέναι ;

ΕΥΘ. Καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων θαυμασιώτερα, ὦ Σώκρατες,
ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ οὐκ ἴσασιν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ πόλεμον ἄρα ἡγεῖ σὺ εἶναι τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς 30
θεοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἔχθρας γε δεινὰς καὶ μάχας
καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά, οἷα λέγεταί τε ὑπὸ τῶν
C ποιητῶν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν γραφέων τά τε ἄλλα
ἱερὰ ἡμῖν καταπεποίκιλται, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς μεγάλοις
Παναθηναίοις ὁ πέπλος μεστὸς τῶν τοιούτων ποικιλ- 35
μάτων ἀνάγεται εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ; ταῦτα ἀληθῆ
φῶμεν εἶναι, ὦ Εὐθύφρον ;

ΕΥΘ. Μὴ μόνον γε, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ ἄρτι
εἶπον, καὶ ἄλλα σοι ἐγὼ πολλά, ἐάνπερ βούλῃ, περὶ τῶν
θείων διηγήσομαι, ἃ σὺ ἀκούων εὖ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι ἐκπλαγήσει. 40

7 VII. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν μοι 6
εἰσαῦθις ἐπὶ σχολῆς διηγήσει· νυνὶ δέ, ὅπερ ἄρτι σε
ἠρόμην, πειρῶ σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν. οὐ γάρ με, ὦ ἑταῖρε, D
τὸ πρότερον ἱκανῶς ἐδίδαξας ἐρωτήσαντα τὸ ὅσιον, ὅ
5 τί ποτ᾽ εἴη, ἀλλά μοι εἶπες, ὅτι τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὅσιον
ὄν, ὃ σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς, φόνου ἐπεξιὼν τῷ πατρί.

ΕΥΘ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἔλεγον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ
φῂς εἶναι ὅσια.

10 ΕΥΘ. Καὶ γὰρ ἔστι.

ΣΩ. Μέμνησαι οὖν, ὅτι οὐ τοῦτό σοι διεκελευόμην,
ἕν τι ἢ δύο με διδάξαι τῶν πολλῶν ὁσίων, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο
αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος, ᾧ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά ἐστιν ; ἔφησθα
γάρ που μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ τά τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ E
15 ὅσια ὅσια· ἢ οὐ μνημονεύεις ;

ΕΥΘ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ταύτην τοίνυν με αὐτὴν δίδαξον τὴν ἰδέαν, τίς
ποτέ ἐστιν, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων καὶ χρώμενος
αὐτῇ παραδείγματι, ὃ μὲν ἂν τοιοῦτον ᾖ, ὧν ἂν ἢ σὺ
20 ἢ ἄλλος τις πράττῃ, φῶ ὅσιον εἶναι, ὃ δ᾽ ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτον,
μὴ φῶ.

ΕΥΘ. Ἀλλ᾽ εἰ οὕτω βούλει, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὕτω
σοι φράσω.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν βούλομαί γε.

25 ΕΥΘ. Ἔστι τοίνυν τὸ μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς προσφιλὲς
ὅσιον, τὸ δὲ μὴ προσφιλὲς ἀνόσιον. 7

ΣΩ. Παγκάλως, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, καὶ ὡς ἐγὼ ἐζήτουν
ἀποκρίνασθαί σε, οὕτω νῦν ἀπεκρίνω. εἰ μέντοι ἀληθῶς,
τοῦτο οὔπω οἶδα, ἀλλὰ σὺ δῆλον ὅτι ἐπεκδιδάξεις ὡς
30 ἔστιν ἀληθῆ ἃ λέγεις.

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

7   VIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, ἐπισκεψώμεθα, τί λέγομεν. τὸ 8
μὲν θεοφιλές τε καὶ ὁ θεοφιλὴς ἄνθρωπος ὅσιος, τὸ δὲ
θεομισὲς καὶ ὁ θεομισὴς ἀνόσιος· οὐ ταὐτὸν δ᾽ ἐστίν,
ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντιώτατον τὸ ὅσιον τῷ ἀνοσίῳ · οὐχ
οὕτως εἴρηται ;   5
   ΕΥΘ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.
   ΣΩ. Καὶ εὖ γε φαίνεται εἰρῆσθαι.
B   ΕΥΘ. Δοκῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
   ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι στασιάζουσιν οἱ θεοί, ὦ Εὐθύ-
φρον, καὶ διαφέρονται ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἔχθρα ἐστὶν ἐν αὐ- 10
τοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ τοῦτο εἴρηται ;
   ΕΥΘ. Εἴρηται γάρ.
   ΣΩ. Ἔχθραν δὲ καὶ ὀργάς, ὦ ἄριστε, ἡ περὶ τίνων
διαφορὰ ποιεῖ ; ὧδε δὲ σκοπῶμεν. ἆρ᾽ ἂν εἰ διαφεροί-
μεθα ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ, ὁπότερα πλείω, ἡ 15
περὶ τούτων διαφορὰ ἐχθροὺς ἂν ἡμᾶς ποιοῖ καὶ ὀργί-
ζεσθαι ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἐπὶ λογισμὸν ἐλθόντες περί γε τῶν
C τοιούτων ταχὺ ἂν ἀπαλλαγεῖμεν ;
   ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.
   ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος εἰ 20
διαφεροίμεθα, ἐπὶ τὸ μετρεῖν ἐλθόντες ταχὺ παυσαίμεθ᾽
ἂν τῆς διαφορᾶς ;
   ΕΥΘ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.
   ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπί γε τὸ ἱστάναι ἐλθόντες, ὡς ἐγῷμαι,
περὶ τοῦ βαρυτέρου τε καὶ κουφοτέρου διακριθεῖμεν 25
ἄν ;
   ΕΥΘ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ ;
   ΣΩ. Περὶ τίνος δὲ δὴ διενεχθέντες καὶ ἐπί τινα κρί-
σιν οὐ δυνάμενοι ἀφικέσθαι ἐχθροί γε ἂν ἀλλήλοις εἶμεν
καὶ ὀργιζοίμεθα ; ἴσως οὐ πρόχειρόν σοί ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐμοῦ 30
D λέγοντος σκόπει, εἰ τάδ᾽ ἐστὶ τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον

8 καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. ἆρα οὐ 7
ταῦτά ἐστιν, περὶ ὧν διενεχθέντες καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπὶ
ἱκανὴν κρίσιν αὐτῶν ἐλθεῖν ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις γιγνόμεθα,
35 ὅταν γιγνώμεθα, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι
πάντες ;

ΕΥΘ. Ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ διαφορά, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ
περὶ τούτων.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; οἱ θεοί, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, οὐκ εἴπερ τι δια-
40 φέρονται, διὰ ταῦτα διαφέροιντ᾽ ἄν ;

ΕΥΘ. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τῶν θεῶν ἄρα, ὦ γενναῖε Εὐθύφρον, ἄλλοι ε
ἄλλα δίκαια ἡγοῦνται κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ καλὰ
καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά· οὐ γὰρ ἄν που
45 ἐστασίαζον ἀλλήλοις, εἰ μὴ περὶ τούτων διεφέροντο· ἦ
γάρ ;

ΕΥΘ. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἅπερ καλὰ ἡγοῦνται ἕκαστοι καὶ ἀγαθὰ
καὶ δίκαια, ταῦτα καὶ φιλοῦσιν, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τούτων
50 μισοῦσιν ;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ταὐτὰ δέ γε, ὡς σὺ φῄς, οἱ μὲν δίκαια ἡγοῦνται,
οἱ δὲ ἄδικα· περὶ ἃ καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦντες στασιάζουσί 8
τε καὶ πολεμοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις· ἀρ᾽ οὐχ οὕτως ;

55 ΕΥΘ. Οὕτω.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτ᾽ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, μισεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν
καὶ φιλεῖται, καὶ θεομισῆ τε καὶ θεοφιλῆ ταῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη.

ΕΥΘ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅσια ἄρα καὶ ἀνόσια τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν εἴη, ὦ
60 Εὐθύφρον, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ.

ΕΥΘ. Κινδυνεύει.

9   ΙΧ. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὃ ἠρόμην ἀπεκρίνω, ὦ θαυμάσιε.

8 οὐ γὰρ τοῦτό γε ἠρώτων, ὃ τυγχάνει ταὐτὸν ὂν ὅσιόν 9
τε καὶ ἀνόσιον, ὃ δ' ἂν θεοφιλὲς ᾖ, καὶ θεομισές ἐστιν,
B ὡς ἔοικεν. ὥστε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ὃ σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς τὸν πατέρα
κολάζων, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν, εἰ τοῦτο δρῶν τῷ μὲν Διὶ 5
προσφιλὲς ποιεῖς, τῷ δὲ Κρόνῳ καὶ τῷ Οὐρανῷ ἐχθρόν,
καὶ τῷ μὲν Ἡφαίστῳ φίλον, τῇ δὲ Ἥρᾳ ἐχθρόν· καὶ εἴ
τις ἄλλος τῶν θεῶν ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ διαφέρεται περὶ αὐτοῦ,
καὶ ἐκείνοις κατὰ ταὐτά.

ΕΥΘ. Ἀλλ' οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, περί γε τούτου τῶν 10
θεῶν οὐδένα ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ διαφέρεσθαι, ὡς οὐ δεῖ δίκην
διδόναι ἐκεῖνον, ὃς ἂν ἀδίκως τινὰ ἀποκτείνῃ.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ἤδη τινὸς ἤκου-
C σας ἀμφισβητοῦντος, ὡς τὸν ἀδίκως ἀποκτείναντα ἢ
ἄλλο ἀδίκως ποιοῦντα ὁτιοῦν οὐ δεῖ δίκην διδόναι; 15

ΕΥΘ. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν παύονται ταῦτα ἀμφισβητοῦντες
καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις. ἀδικοῦντες γὰρ
πάμπολλα πάντα ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι φεύγοντες τὴν
δίκην.

ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ ὁμολογοῦσιν, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ἀδικεῖν, καὶ 20
ὁμολογοῦντες ὅμως οὐ δεῖν φασι σφᾶς διδόναι δίκην;

ΕΥΘ. Οὐδαμῶς τοῦτό γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα πᾶν γε ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσιν. τοῦτο
γὰρ οἶμαι οὐ τολμῶσι λέγειν οὐδ' ἀμφισβητεῖν, ὡς οὐχί,
D εἴπερ ἀδικοῦσί γε, δοτέον δίκην· ἀλλ' οἶμαι οὔ φασιν 25
ἀδικεῖν. ἦ γάρ;

ΕΥΘ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐκεῖνό γε ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὡς οὐ τὸν
ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ διδόναι δίκην· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἴσως ἀμφισβη-
τοῦσιν, τὸ τίς ἐστιν ὁ ἀδικῶν καὶ τί δρῶν καὶ πότε. 30

ΕΥΘ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτά γε ταῦτα καὶ οἱ θεοὶ πεπόνθασιν,

9 εἴπερ στασιάζουσι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὡς ὁ 8
σὸς λόγος, καὶ οἱ μέν φασιν ἀλλήλους ἀδικεῖν, οἱ δὲ οὔ
35 φασιν ; ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνό γε δήπου, ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὐδεὶς οὔτε
θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων τολμᾷ λέγειν, ὡς οὐ τῷ γε ἀδι- E
κοῦντι δοτέον δίκην.

ΕΥΘ. Ναί, τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθὲς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ
κεφάλαιον.

40   ΣΩ. Ἀλλ᾽ ἕκαστόν γε οἶμαι, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τῶν πραχ-
θέντων ἀμφισβητοῦσιν οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες, καὶ ἄνθρω-
ποι καὶ θεοί, εἴπερ ἀμφισβητοῦσι θεοί· πράξεώς τινος
πέρι διαφερόμενοι οἱ μὲν δικαίως φασὶν αὐτὴν πεπρᾶχ-
θαι, οἱ δὲ ἀδίκως· ἆρ᾽ οὐχ οὕτω ;

45   ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

10   Χ. ΣΩ. Ἴθι νυν, ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρον, δίδαξον καὶ ἐμέ, 9
ἵνα σοφώτερος γένωμαι, τί σοι τεκμήριόν ἐστιν, ὡς
πάντες θεοὶ ἡγοῦνται ἐκεῖνον ἀδίκως τεθνάναι, ὃς ἂν
θητεύων ἀνδροφόνος γενόμενος, ξυνδεθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ
5 δεσπότου τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, φθάσῃ τελευτήσας διὰ τὰ
δεσμά, πρὶν τὸν ξυνδήσαντα παρὰ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν περὶ
αὐτοῦ πυθέσθαι, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιούτου
δὴ ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἐπεξιέναι καὶ ἐπισκήπτεσθαι φόνου τὸν
υἱὸν τῷ πατρί· ἴθι, περὶ τούτων πειρῶ τί μοι σαφὲς
10 ἐνδείξασθαι, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον πάντες θεοὶ ἡγοῦνται
ὀρθῶς ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν· κἄν μοι ἱκανῶς ἐνδείξῃ, B
ἐγκωμιάζων σε ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ οὐδέποτε παύσομαι.

ΕΥΘ. Ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔργον ἐστίν, ὦ Σώκρατες·
ἐπεὶ πάνυ γε σαφῶς ἔχοιμι ἂν ἐπιδεῖξαί σοι.

1   ΣΩ. Μανθάνω· ὅτι σοι δοκῶ τῶν δικαστῶν δυσμα-
θέστερος εἶναι· ἐπεὶ ἐκείνοις γε ἐνδείξει δῆλον ὅτι, ὡς
ἄδικά τέ ἐστιν καὶ οἱ θεοὶ ἅπαντες τὰ τοιαῦτα μισοῦ-
σιν.

9 ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε σαφῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐάνπερ ἀκούωσί 10
γέ μου λέγοντος.   20

c ΧΙ. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἀκούσονται, ἐάνπερ εὖ δοκῇς λέγειν. 11
τόδε δέ σου ἐνενόησα ἅμα λέγοντος, καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν
σκοπῶ· εἰ ὅ τι μάλιστά με Εὐθύφρων διδάξειεν, ὡς οἱ
θεοὶ ἅπαντες τὸν τοιοῦτον θάνατον ἡγοῦνται ἄδικον
εἶναι, τί μᾶλλον ἐγὼ μεμάθηκα παρ' Εὐθύφρονος, τί 5
ποτ' ἐστὶν τὸ ὅσιόν τε καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον; θεομισὲς μὲν
γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη ἄν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ
τούτῳ ἐφάνη ἄρτι ὡρισμένα τὸ ὅσιον καὶ μή· τὸ γὰρ
θεομισὲς ὂν καὶ θεοφιλὲς ἐφάνη· ὥστε τούτου ἀφίημι
D σε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον· εἰ βούλει, πάντες αὐτὸ ἡγείσθων θεοὶ 10
ἄδικον καὶ πάντες μισούντων. ἀλλ' ἆρα τοῦτο νῦν
ἐπανορθώμεθα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ὡς ὃ μὲν ἂν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ
μισῶσιν, ἀνόσιόν ἐστιν, ὃ δ' ἂν φιλῶσιν, ὅσιον· ὃ δ' ἂν
οἱ μὲν φιλῶσιν, οἱ δὲ μισῶσιν, οὐδέτερα ἢ ἀμφότερα ;
ἆρ' οὕτω βούλει ἡμῖν ὡρίσθαι νῦν περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου καὶ 15
τοῦ ἀνοσίου ;

ΕΥΘ. Τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἐμέ γε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ τὸ σὸν
σκόπει, εἰ τοῦτο ὑποθέμενος οὕτω ῥᾷστά με διδάξεις ὃ
ὑπέσχου.   20

E ΕΥΘ. Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε φαίην ἂν τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ὅσιον, ὃ
ἂν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον, ὃ ἂν πάντες
θεοὶ μισῶσιν, ἀνόσιον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπισκοπῶμεν αὖ τοῦτο, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, εἰ
καλῶς λέγεται, ἢ ἐῶμεν καὶ οὕτως ἡμῶν τε αὐτῶν ἀπο- 25
δεχώμεθα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐὰν μόνον φῇ τίς τι ἔχειν
οὕτω, ξυγχωροῦντες ἔχειν ; ἢ σκεπτέον τί λέγει ὁ λέγων ;

ΕΥΘ. Σκεπτέον· οἶμαι μέντοι ἔγωγε τοῦτο νυνὶ κα-
λῶς λέγεσθαι.

12 XII. ΣΩ. Τάχ᾽, ὠγαθέ, βέλτιον εἰσόμεθα. ἐννόησυ
γὰρ τὸ τοιόνδε· ἆρα τὸ ὅσιον, ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστιν, φιλεῖται 10
ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ ὅτι φιλεῖται, ὅσιόν ἐστιν ;

ΕΥΘ. Οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅ τι λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

5 ΣΩ. Ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι σαφέστερον φράσαι.
λέγομέν τι φερόμενον καὶ φέρον, καὶ ἀγόμενον καὶ ἄγον,
καὶ ὁρώμενον καὶ ὁρῶν· καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μανθάνεις
ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐστὶ καὶ ᾗ ἕτερα ;

ΕΥΘ. Ἔγωγέ μοι δοκῶ μανθάνειν.

10 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φιλούμενόν τί ἐστιν, καὶ τούτου
ἕτερον τὸ φιλοῦν ;

ΕΥΘ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ ;

ΣΩ. Λέγε δή μοι, πότερον τὸ φερόμενον, διότι φέρε- B
ται, φερόμενόν ἐστιν, ἢ δι᾽ ἄλλο τι ;

15 ΕΥΘ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸ ἀγόμενον δή, διότι ἄγεται, καὶ τὸ ὁρώ-
μενον, διότι ὁρᾶται ;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα διότι ὁρώμενόν γέ ἐστιν, διὰ τοῦτο ὁρᾶ-
20 ται, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον διότι ὁρᾶται, διὰ τοῦτο ὁρώμενον·
οὐδὲ διότι ἀγόμενόν ἐστιν, διὰ τοῦτο ἄγεται, ἀλλὰ διότι
ἄγεται, διὰ τοῦτο ἀγόμενον· οὐδὲ διότι φερόμενον, φέ-
ρεται, ἀλλὰ διότι φέρεται, φερόμενον. ἆρα κατάδηλον, ὦ
Εὐθύφρον, ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν ; βούλομαι δὲ τόδε, ὅτι, C
25 εἴ τι γίγνεται ἤ τι πάσχει, οὐχ ὅτι γιγνόμενόν ἐστι,
γίγνεται, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι γίγνεται, γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν· οὐδ᾽ ὅτι
πάσχον ἐστί, πάσχει, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι πάσχει, πάσχον ἐστίν·
ἢ οὐ ξυγχωρεῖς οὕτως ;

ΕΥΘ. Ἔγωγε.

30 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ φιλούμενον ἢ γιγνόμενόν τί ἐστιν
ἢ πάσχον τι ὑπό του ;

10   ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε.   12

ΣΩ. Καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα οὕτως ἔχει, ὥσπερ τὰ πρότερα·
οὐχ ὅτι φιλούμενόν ἐστιν, φιλεῖται ὑπὸ ὧν φιλεῖται,
ἀλλ' ὅτι φιλεῖται, φιλούμενον ;   35

ΕΤΘ. Ἀνάγκη.

D   ΣΩ. Τί δὴ οὖν λέγομεν περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου, ὦ Εὐθύφρον ;
ἄλλο τι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν πάντων, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος ;

ΕΤΘ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἆρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι ; 40

ΕΤΘ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Διότι ἄρα ὅσιόν ἐστιν, φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι
φιλεῖται, διὰ τοῦτο ὅσιόν ἐστιν ;

ΕΤΘ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ διότι γε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν, φι- 45
λούμενόν ἐστι καὶ θεοφιλὲς τὸ θεοφιλές.

ΕΤΘ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ θεοφιλὲς ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ὦ Εὐθύφρον,
οὐδὲ τὸ ὅσιον θεοφιλές, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ἀλλ' ἕτερον τοῦτο
τούτου.   50

E   ΕΤΘ. Πῶς δή, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι ὁμολογοῦμεν τὸ μὲν ὅσιον διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖ-
σθαι, ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διότι φιλεῖται, ὅσιον
εἶναι· ἢ γάρ ;

ΕΤΘ. Ναί.   55

XIII. ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε θεοφιλὲς ὅτι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν, 13
αὐτῷ τούτῳ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι θεοφιλὲς εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι
θεοφιλές, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖσθαι.

ΕΤΘ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἴ γε ταὐτὸν ἦν, ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρον, τὸ 5
θεοφιλὲς καὶ τὸ ὅσιον, εἰ μὲν διὰ τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι ἐφι-
11 λεῖτο τὸ ὅσιον, καὶ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλὲς εἶναι ἐφιλεῖτο ἂν

13 τὸ θεοφιλές, εἰ δὲ διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ θεῶν τὸ θεο- 11
φιλὲς θεοφιλὲς ἦν, καὶ τὸ ὅσιον ἂν διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι
10 ὅσιον ἦν· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς ὅτι ἐναντίως ἔχετον, ὡς παντά-
πασιν ἑτέρω ὄντε ἀλλήλων. τὸ μὲν γάρ, ὅτι φιλεῖται,
ἐστὶν οἷον φιλεῖσθαι· τὸ δ᾽ ὅτι ἐστὶν οἷον φιλεῖσθαι,
διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖται. καὶ κινδυνεύεις, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ἐρω-
τώμενος τὸ ὅσιον, ὅ τί ποτ᾽ ἐστί, τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν μοι
15 αὐτοῦ οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλῶσαι, πάθος δέ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ
λέγειν, ὅ τι πέπονθε τοῦτο τὸ ὅσιον, φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ Β
πάντων θεῶν· ὅ τι δὲ ὄν, οὔπω εἶπες. εἰ οὖν σοι φίλον,
μή με ἀποκρύψῃ, ἀλλὰ πάλιν εἰπὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τί ποτε
ὂν τὸ ὅσιον εἴτε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν εἴτε ὁτιδὴ πάσχει·
20 οὐ γὰρ περὶ τούτου διοισόμεθα· ἀλλ᾽ εἰπὲ προθύμως, τί
ἐστιν τό τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον ;

ΕΤΘ. Ἀλλ᾽, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε ὅπως σοι
εἴπω ὃ νοῶ. περιέρχεται γάρ πως ἡμῖν ἀεὶ ὃ ἂν προ-
θώμεθα, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἂν ἱδρυσώμεθα
25 αὐτό.

ΣΩ. Τοῦ ἡμετέρου προγόνου, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ἔοικεν
εἶναι Δαιδάλου τὰ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενα. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ C
ἐγὼ ἔλεγον καὶ ἐτιθέμην, ἴσως ἄν με ἐπέσκωπτες, ὡς
ἄρα καὶ ἐμοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ξυγγένειαν τὰ ἐν τοῖς
30 λόγοις ἔργα ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἄν
τις αὐτὰ θῇ· νῦν δὲ σαὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰσίν· ἄλλου
δή τινος δεῖ σκώμματος. οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλουσι σοὶ μένειν,
ὡς καὶ αὐτῷ σοι δοκεῖ.

ΕΤΘ. Ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ σχεδόν τι τοῦ αὐτοῦ σκώμματος,
35 ὦ Σώκρατες, δεῖσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα· τὸ γὰρ περιιέναι
τούτοις τοῦτο καὶ μὴ μένειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ
ἐντιθείς, ἀλλὰ σύ μοι δοκεῖς ὁ Δαίδαλος· ἐπεὶ ἐμοῦ γε D
ἕνεκα ἔμενεν ἂν ταῦτα οὕτως.

11 ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύω ἄρα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρὸς 13
δεινότερος γεγονέναι τὴν τέχνην τοσούτῳ, ὅσῳ ὁ μὲν τὰ 40
αὐτοῦ μόνα ἐποίει οὐ μένοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς τοῖς ἐμαυτοῦ,
ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια. καὶ δῆτα τοῦτό μοι τῆς
τέχνης ἐστὶ κομψότατον, ὅτι ἄκων εἰμὶ σοφός. ἐβου-
λόμην γὰρ ἄν μοι τοὺς λόγους μένειν καὶ ἀκινήτως
E ἱδρῦσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τῇ Δαιδάλου σοφίᾳ τὰ Ταντά- 45
λου χρήματα γενέσθαι. καὶ τούτων μὲν ἅδην· ἐπειδὴ
δέ μοι δοκεῖς σὺ τρυφᾶν, αὐτός σοι ξυμπροθυμήσομαι
δεῖξαι ὅπως ἄν με διδάξῃς περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου καὶ μὴ προ-
αποκάμῃς. ἰδὲ γὰρ εἰ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν σοι δοκεῖ δίκαιον
εἶναι πᾶν τὸ ὅσιον. 50

ΕΥΘ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ πᾶν τὸ δίκαιον ὅσιον, ἢ τὸ μὲν
12 ὅσιον πᾶν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον οὐ πᾶν ὅσιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ
μὲν αὐτοῦ ὅσιον, τὸ δέ τι καὶ ἄλλο ;

ΕΥΘ. Οὐχ ἕπομαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῖς λεγομένοις. 55

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν νεώτερός γέ μου εἶ οὐκ ἐλάττονι ἢ ὅσῳ
σοφώτερος· ἀλλ', ὃ λέγω, τρυφᾷς ὑπὸ πλούτου τῆς
σοφίας. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ξύντεινε σαυτόν· καὶ γὰρ
οὐδὲ χαλεπὸν κατανοῆσαι ὃ λέγω. λέγω γὰρ δὴ τὸ
ἐναντίον ἢ ὁ ποιητὴς ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιήσας 60

Ζῆνα δὲ τόν θ' ἔρξαντα, καὶ ὃς τάδε πάντ'
ἐφύτευσεν,

B Οὐκ ἐθέλεις εἰπεῖν· ἵνα γὰρ δέος, ἔνθα καὶ
αἰδώς.

ἐγὼ οὖν τούτῳ διαφέρομαι τῷ ποιητῇ. εἴπω σοι ὅπῃ ; 65
ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Οὐ δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι, ἵνα δέος, ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς·
πολλοὶ γάρ μοι δοκοῦσι καὶ νόσους καὶ πενίας καὶ ἄλλα

13 πολλὰ τοιαῦτα δεδιότες δεδιέναι μέν, αἰδεῖσθαι δὲ μηδὲν 12
70 ταῦτα ἃ δεδίασιν. οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ ;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα γε αἰδώς, ἔνθα καὶ δέος εἶναι· ἐπεὶ
ἔστιν ὅστις αἰδούμενός τι πρᾶγμα καὶ αἰσχυνόμενος οὐ
πεφόβηταί τε καὶ δέδοικεν ἅμα δόξαν πονηρίας ;   c

75 ΕΥΘ. Δέδοικε μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ᾽ ὀρθῶς ἔχει λέγειν· ἵνα γὰρ δέος, ἔνθα
καὶ αἰδώς· ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα μὲν αἰδώς, ἔνθα καὶ δέος, οὐ μέντοι
ἵνα γε δέος, πανταχοῦ αἰδώς. ἐπὶ πλέον γὰρ οἶμαι δέος
αἰδοῦς· μόριον γὰρ αἰδὼς δέους, ὥσπερ ἀριθμοῦ περιτ-
80 τόν, ὥστε οὐχ ἵναπερ ἀριθμός, ἔνθα καὶ περιττόν, ἵνα
δὲ περιττόν, ἔνθα καὶ ἀριθμός. ἔπει γάρ που νῦν γε ;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον τοίνυν καὶ ἐκεῖ λέγων ἠρώτων, ἆρα
ἵνα δίκαιον, ἔνθα καὶ ὅσιον, ἢ ἵνα μὲν ὅσιον, ἔνθα καὶ
85 δίκαιον, ἵνα δὲ δίκαιον, οὐ πανταχοῦ ὅσιον· μόριον D
γὰρ τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὅσιον. οὕτω φῶμεν ἢ ἄλλως σοι
δοκεῖ ;

ΕΥΘ. Οὔκ, ἀλλ᾽ οὕτω. φαίνει γάρ μοι ὀρθῶς λέγειν.

14 XIV. ΣΩ. Ὅρα δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο. εἰ γὰρ μέρος τὸ
ὅσιον τοῦ δικαίου, δεῖ δὴ ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐξευρεῖν τὸ
ποῖον μέρος ἂν εἴη τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὅσιον. εἰ μὲν οὖν σύ
με ἠρώτας τι τῶν νῦν δή, οἷον ποῖον μέρος ἐστὶν ἀριθ-
5 μοῦ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τίς ὢν τυγχάνει οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμός,
εἶπον ἂν ὅτι ὃς ἂν μὴ σκαληνὸς ᾖ ἀλλ᾽ ἰσοσκελής· ἢ οὐ
δοκεῖ σοι ;

ΕΥΘ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Πειρῶ δὴ καὶ σὺ ἐμὲ οὕτω διδάξαι, τὸ ποῖον E
10 μέρος τοῦ δικαίου ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ἵνα καὶ Μελήτῳ λέγωμεν
μηκέθ᾽ ἡμᾶς ἀδικεῖν μηδὲ ἀσεβείας γράφεσθαι, ὡς ἱκα-

12 νῶς ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ μεμαθηκότας τά τε εὐσεβῆ καὶ ὅσια 14
καὶ τὰ μή.

ΕΥΘ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ
μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβές τε καὶ ὅσιον, τὸ περὶ 15
τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν· τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων
τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι τοῦ δικαίου μέρος.

XV. ΣΩ. Καὶ καλῶς γέ μοι, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, φαίνει 15
13 λέγειν· ἀλλὰ σμικροῦ τινος ἔτι ἐνδεής εἰμι. τὴν γὰρ
θεραπείαν οὔπω ξυνίημι ἥντινα ὀνομάζεις. οὐ γάρ που
λέγεις γε, οἷαίπερ καὶ αἱ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα θεραπεῖαί εἰσιν,
τοιαύτην καὶ περὶ θεούς. λέγομεν γάρ που—οἷόν φαμεν, 5
ἵππους οὐ πᾶς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν, ἀλλ’ ὁ ἱππικός·
ἢ γάρ ;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ γάρ που ἱππικὴ ἵππων θεραπεία.

ΕΥΘ. Ναί. 10

ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γε κύνας πᾶς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν, ἀλλ’
ὁ κυνηγετικός.

ΕΥΘ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἡ γάρ που κυνηγετικὴ κυνῶν θεραπεία.

B ΕΥΘ. Ναί. 15

ΣΩ. Ἡ δὲ βοηλατικὴ βοῶν.

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δὲ δὴ ὁσιότης τε καὶ εὐσέβεια θεῶν, ὦ
Εὐθύφρον ; οὕτω λέγεις ;

ΕΥΘ. Ἔγωγε. 20

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν θεραπεία γε πᾶσα ταὐτὸν διαπράττεται ;
οἷον τοιόνδε· ἐπ’ ἀγαθῷ τινί ἐστι καὶ ὠφελίᾳ τοῦ θερα-
πευομένου, ὥσπερ ὁρᾷς δὴ ὅτι οἱ ἵπποι ὑπὸ τῆς ἱππικῆς
θεραπευόμενοι ὠφελοῦνται καὶ βελτίους γίγνονται. ἢ
οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι ; 25

15 ΕΥΘ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ οἱ κύνες γέ που ὑπὸ τῆς κυνηγετικῆς καὶ οἱ
βόες ὑπὸ τῆς βοηλατικῆς, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὡς αὕτως· c
ἢ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ οἴει τοῦ θεραπευομένου τὴν θεραπείαν
30 εἶναι ;

ΕΥΘ. Μὰ Δί᾿ οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ᾿ ἐπ᾿ ὠφελίᾳ ;

ΕΥΘ. Πῶς δ᾿ οὔ ;

ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν καὶ ἡ ὁσιότης θεραπεία οὖσα θεῶν ὠφε-
35 λία τέ ἐστι θεῶν καὶ βελτίους τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖ ; καὶ
σὺ τοῦτο ξυγχωρήσαις ἄν, ὡς ἐπειδάν τι ὅσιον ποιῇς,
βελτίω τινὰ τῶν θεῶν ἀπεργάζει ;

ΕΥΘ. Μὰ Δί᾿ οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, οἶμαί σε τοῦτο λέ-
40 γειν· πολλοῦ καὶ δέω· ἀλλὰ τούτου δὴ ἕνεκα καὶ ἀνηρό-
μην, τίνα ποτὲ λέγοις τὴν θεραπείαν τῶν θεῶν, οὐχ D
ἡγούμενός σε τοιαύτην λέγειν.

ΕΥΘ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ τοιαύτην
λέγω.

45 ΣΩ. Εἶεν· ἀλλὰ τίς δὴ θεῶν θεραπεία εἴη ἂν ἡ
ὁσιότης ;

ΕΥΘ. Ἥπερ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δοῦλοι τοὺς δεσπότας
θεραπεύουσιν.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνω· ὑπηρετική τις ἄν, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη θεοῖς.

50 ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

16 XVI. ΣΩ. Ἔχοις ἂν οὖν εἰπεῖν, ἡ ἰατροῖς ὑπηρετικὴ
εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν τυγχάνει οὖσα ὑπηρετική ;
οὐκ εἰς ὑγιείας οἴει ;

ΕΥΘ. Ἔγωγε.

5 ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; ἡ ναυπηγοῖς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς τίνος ἔργου E
ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετική ἐστιν ;

13   ΕΥΘ. Δῆλον ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς πλοίου.   16
      ΣΩ. Καὶ ἡ οἰκοδόμοις γέ που εἰς οἰκίας ;
      ΕΥΘ. Ναί.
      ΣΩ. Εἰπὲ δή, ὦ ἄριστε· ἡ δὲ θεοῖς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς 10
τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετικὴ ἂν εἴη ; δῆλον γὰρ
ὅτι σὺ οἶσθα, ἐπειδήπερ τά γε θεῖα κάλλιστά γε φῂς
εἰδέναι ἀνθρώπων.
      ΕΥΘ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες.
      ΣΩ. Εἰπὲ δὴ πρὸς Διός, τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο τὸ 15
πάγκαλον ἔργον, ὃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται ἡμῖν ὑπηρέταις
χρώμενοι ;
      ΕΥΘ. Πολλὰ καὶ καλά ὦ Σώκρατες.
14   ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ στρατηγοί, ὦ φίλε· ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως τὸ
κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ῥᾳδίως ἂν εἴποις, ὅτι νίκην ἐν τῷ 20
πολέμῳ ἀπεργάζονται· ἢ οὔ ;
      ΕΥΘ. Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ ;
      ΣΩ. Πολλὰ δέ γ᾽ οἶμαι καὶ καλὰ καὶ οἱ γεωργοί·
ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστιν τῆς ἀπεργασίας
ἡ ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφή.   25
      ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.
      ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή ; τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν ἃ οἱ θεοὶ
ἀπεργάζονται, τί τὸ κεφάλαιόν ἐστι τῆς ἐργασίας ;
      ΕΥΘ. Καὶ ὀλίγον σοι πρότερον εἶπον, ὦ Σώκρατες,
B ὅτι πλείονος ἔργου ἐστὶν ἀκριβῶς πάντα ταῦτα ὡς ἔχει 30
μαθεῖν· τόδε μέντοι σοι ἁπλῶς λέγω, ὅτι ἐὰν μὲν κεχα-
ρισμένα τις ἐπίστηται τοῖς θεοῖς λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν
εὐχόμενός τε καὶ θύων, ταῦτ᾽ ἔστι τὰ ὅσια, καὶ σῴζει
τὰ τοιαῦτα τούς τε ἰδίους οἴκους καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν
πόλεων· τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία τῶν κεχαρισμένων ἀσεβῆ, ἃ δὴ 35
καὶ ἀνατρέπει ἅπαντα καὶ ἀπόλλυσιν.
      XVII. ΣΩ. Ἦ πολύ μοι διὰ βραχυτέρων, ὦ Εὐθύ- 17

17 φρον, εἰ ἐβούλου, εἶπες ἂν τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν ἠρώτων. 14
ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ πρόθυμός με εἶ διδάξαι, δῆλος εἶ. καί c
γὰρ νῦν ἐπειδὴ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ ἦσθα, ἀπετράπου· ὃ εἰ ἀπε-
5 κρίνω, ἱκανῶς ἂν ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ τὴν ὁσιότητα ἐμεμαθήκη.
νῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα τῷ ἐρωτωμένῳ ἀκο-
λουθεῖν, ὅπη ἂν ἐκεῖνος ὑπάγῃ· τί δὴ αὖ λέγεις τὸ ὅσιον
εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁσιότητα ; οὐχὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ τοῦ θύειν
τε καὶ εὔχεσθαι ;
10   ΕΥΘ. Ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ θύειν δωρεῖσθαί ἐστι τοῖς θεοῖς, τὸ δ’
εὔχεσθαι αἰτεῖν τοὺς θεούς ;
ΕΥΘ. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμη ἄρα αἰτήσεως καὶ δόσεως θεοῖς ὁσιό- D
15 της ἂν εἴη ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου.
ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ξυνῆκας ὃ εἶπον.
ΣΩ. Ἐπιθυμητὴς γάρ εἰμι, ὦ φίλε, τῆς σῆς σοφίας
καὶ προσέχω τὸν νοῦν αὐτῇ, ὥστε οὐ χαμαὶ πεσεῖται ὅ
τι ἂν εἴπῃς. ἀλλά μοι λέξον, τίς αὕτη ἡ ὑπηρεσία ἐστὶ
20 τοῖς θεοῖς ; αἰτεῖν τε φὴς αὐτοὺς καὶ διδόναι ἐκείνοις ;
ΕΥΘ. Ἔγωγε.
18 XVIII. ΣΩ. Ἆρ’ οὖν οὐ τὸ ὀρθῶς αἰτεῖν ἂν εἴη, ὧν
δεόμεθα παρ’ ἐκείνων, ταῦτα αὐτοὺς αἰτεῖν ;
ΕΥΘ. Ἀλλὰ τί ;
ΣΩ. Καὶ αὖ τὸ διδόναι ὀρθῶς, ὧν ἐκεῖνοι τυγχάνου- E
5 σι δεόμενοι παρ’ ἡμῶν, ταῦτα ἐκείνοις αὖ ἀντιδωρεῖ-
σθαι ; οὐ γάρ που τεχνικόν γ’ ἂν εἴη δωροφορεῖν διδόντα
τῳ ταῦτα ὧν οὐδὲν δεῖται.
ΕΥΘ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. Ἐμπορικὴ ἄρα τις ἂν εἴη, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τέχνη ἡ
10 ὁσιότης θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις παρ’ ἀλλήλων.
ΕΥΘ. Ἐμπορική, εἰ οὕτως ἥδιόν σοι ὀνομάζειν.

14 ΣΩ. Ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν ἥδιον ἔμοιγε, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνει ἀληθὲς 18
ὄν. φράσον δέ μοι, τίς ἡ ὠφελία τοῖς θεοῖς τυγχάνει
οὖσα ἀπὸ τῶν δώρων ὧν παρ᾽ ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν; ἃ
μὲν γὰρ διδόασιν, παντὶ δῆλον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστιν 15
15 ἀγαθὸν ὅ τι ἂν μὴ ἐκεῖνοι δῶσιν· ἃ δὲ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν
λαμβάνουσιν, τί ὠφελοῦνται; ἢ τοσοῦτον αὐτῶν
πλεονεκτοῦμεν κατὰ τὴν ἐμπορίαν, ὥστε πάντα
τἀγαθὰ παρ᾽ αὐτῶν λαμβάνομεν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν
οὐδέν; 20

ΕΥΘ. Ἀλλ᾽ οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς θεοὺς ὠφελεῖσ-
θαι ἀπὸ τούτων ἃ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί δήποτ᾽ ἂν εἴη ταῦτα, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τὰ
παρ᾽ ἡμῶν δῶρα τοῖς θεοῖς;

ΕΥΘ. Τί δ᾽ οἴει ἄλλο ἢ τιμή τε καὶ γέρα καὶ ὅπερ 25
ἐγὼ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, χάρις;

B ΣΩ. Κεχαρισμένον ἄρα ἐστίν, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τὸ ὅσιον,
ἀλλ᾽ οὐχὶ ὠφέλιμον οὐδὲ φίλον τοῖς θεοῖς;

ΕΥΘ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε πάντων γε μάλιστα φίλον.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο ἄρ᾽ ἐστὶν αὖ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ὅσιον, τὸ τοῖς 30
θεοῖς φίλον.

ΕΥΘ. Μάλιστά γε.

XIX. ΣΩ. Θαυμάσει οὖν ταῦτα λέγων, ἐάν σοι 19
οἱ λόγοι φαίνωνται μὴ μένοντες ἀλλὰ βαδίζοντες,
καὶ ἐμὲ αἰτιάσει τὸν Δαίδαλον βαδίζοντας αὐτοὺς
ποιεῖν, αὐτὸς ὢν πολύ γε τεχνικώτερος τοῦ Δαιδάλου
καὶ κύκλῳ περιιόντας ποιῶν; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνει ὅτι ὁ 5
λόγος ἡμῖν περιελθὼν πάλιν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἥκει; μέμνησαι
C γάρ που ὅτι ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν τό τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ
θεοφιλὲς οὐ ταὐτὸν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη, ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων·
ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι;

ΕΥΘ. Ἔγωγε. 10

19 ΣΩ. Νῦν οὖν οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον 15
φὴς ὅσιον εἶναι ; τοῦτο δ' ἄλλο τι ἢ θεοφιλὲς γίγνεται·
ἢ οὔ ;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

15 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ἄρτι οὐ καλῶς ὡμολογοῦμεν, ἢ εἰ τότε
καλῶς, νῦν οὐκ ὀρθῶς τιθέμεθα.

ΕΥΘ. Ἔοικεν.

20 ΧΧ. ΣΩ. Ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄρα ἡμῖν πάλιν σκεπτέον, τί
ἐστι τὸ ὅσιον· ὡς ἐγώ, πρὶν ἂν μάθω, ἑκὼν εἶναι οὐκ
ἀποδειλιάσω. ἀλλὰ μή με ἀτιμάσῃς, ἀλλὰ παντὶ D
τρόπῳ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν ὅ τι μάλιστα νῦν εἰπὲ τὴν
5 ἀλήθειαν. οἶσθα γάρ, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων,
καὶ οὐκ ἀφετέος εἶ, ὥσπερ ὁ Πρωτεύς, πρὶν ἂν εἴπῃς.
εἰ γὰρ μὴ ᾔδησθα σαφῶς τό τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον,
οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἄν ποτε ἐπεχείρησας ὑπὲρ ἀνδρὸς θητὸς
ἄνδρα πρεσβύτην πατέρα διωκάθειν φόνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ
10 τοὺς θεοὺς ἂν ἔδεισας παρακινδυνεύειν, μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς
αὐτὸ ποιήσοις, καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ᾐσχύνθης. νῦν δὲ
εὖ οἶδα ὅτι σαφῶς οἴει εἰδέναι τό τε ὅσιον καὶ μή· E
εἰπὲ οὖν, ὦ βέλτιστε Εὐθύφρον, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύψῃ ὅ τι
αὐτὸ ἡγεῖ.

15 ΕΥΘ. Εἰσαῦθις τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες· νῦν γὰρ σπεύδω
ποι, καί μοι ὥρα ἀπιέναι.

ΣΩ. Οἷα ποιεῖς, ὦ ἑταῖρε· ἀπ' ἐλπίδος με καταβα-
λὼν μεγάλης ἀπέρχει, ἣν εἶχον, ὡς παρὰ σοῦ μαθὼν τά
τε ὅσια καὶ μὴ καὶ τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον γραφῆς ἀπαλλά-
20 ξομαι, ἐνδειξάμενος ἐκείνῳ ὅτι σοφὸς ἤδη παρ' Εὐθύ- 16
φρονος τὰ θεῖα γέγονα καὶ ὅτι οὐκέτι ὑπ' ἀγνοίας αὐτο-
σχεδιάζω οὐδὲ καινοτομῶ περὶ αὐτά, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν
ἄλλον βίον ὅτι ἄμεινον βιωσοίμην.

NOTES.

The references in the Notes are to chapters and lines of the Text.
Cp. = compare. Sc. (*scilicet* = understand *or* supply.
κ.τ.λ. = καὶ τὰ λοιπά = *et cetera.* Lit. = literally.
An obelus (†) denotes that the reading of the Text is uncertain.

Ch. 1-3.—*Euthyphro meets Socrates outside the court of the King Archon, and learns that Meletus has prosecuted him for corrupting the young and making innovations in religion. Euthyphro complains that his prophecies are ridiculed by the people; Socrates, however, is not afraid of ridicule, but fears that the people may be too much in earnest.*

1. 1. **νεώτερον :** an instance of the "absolute" use of the comparative degree, *i.e.* the standard of comparison is neither expressed nor distinctly implied. Here the meaning is "new" or "strange" as opposed to "old," rather than "newer" as opposed to "new." **ὅτι . . . στοάν :** this clause is explanatory of *νεώτερον.*

2. **Λυκείῳ :** the Lyceum was a gymnasium in the eastern suburbs of Athens, founded by Pericles, so called from the neighbouring temple of Apollo Lyceius. It was a favourite resort of Socrates; Aristotle afterwards taught there.

3. **τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοάν :** the βασιλεύς was one of the nine archons elected annually, and had jurisdiction in certain cases involving religion. The porch or colonnade containing the court of the βασιλεύς was situated in the Agora or market place.

4. **δίκη :** this is the general term for a law-case at Athens. Cases were divided into two classes : (*a*) δίκαι in the narrower sense, "private suits," (*b*) γραφαί, "public prosecutions." In the latter the state was deemed to have suffered injury as well as the individual who prosecuted. **οὖσα τυγχάνει :** τυγχάνω, in the sense of "to happen," is regularly constructed with the participle (not with the infinitive). It generally implies coincidence, as here, "you have not a case *just when* I have." **πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα :** πρός with the accusative is used of the tribunal before which a case is brought.

5. **Ἀθηναῖοι :** names of peoples are often used without the article. **δίκην :** it was a δίκη in the wider sense, but not in the narrower ; cp.

1. 4, *n.* **αὐτήν**: we might have expected αὐτό, the meaning being "my business"; but the pronoun is assimilated in gender to the complement δίκην.

7. γραφήν σέ τις . . . γέγραπται: the middle γράφομαι means "to draw up an indictment," and is constructed with an internal accusative (γραφήν) and an external (σέ).

8. ἐκεῖνο: this is explained by the following clause ὡς σὺ ἕτερον (*sc.* γέγραψαι).

9. οὐ γὰρ οὖν: γάρ in an answer implies the ellipsis of "yes" or "no," and introduces the reason assigned for the affirmation or denial. Here the meaning is "(You will not consider me guilty,) for I have not indicted any one." οὖν is intensive, "certainly."

13. οὐδ' αὐτὸς πάνυ τι: the adverbial accusative τι is often added to οὐ πάνυ without appreciably affecting the sense. οὐ πάνυ is here "not quite," "not thoroughly"; often it is used for "not at all."

14. νέος . . . τις: the indefinite τις is used to diminish or increase the force of an adjective; translate, "rather young."

15. ἐγῷμαι: crasis for ἐγὼ οἶμαι. **Μέλητον**: see Introduction, § 5. **τῶν δήμων Πιτθεύς**: Attica was divided into townships called δῆμοι, and an Athenian citizen was legally described by his own name, his father's, and the name of his native township; *e.g.* Δημοσθένης Δημοσθένους Παιανιεύς, "Demosthenes (the son) of Demosthenes, of the township of Paeania." The use of the genitive plural τῶν δήμων is apparently a survival from early times when δῆμος was used in the sense of δημότης; the literal meaning would thus be, "among the people of the townships (partitive genitive) a Pitthean." The township of Pitthus (or Pithus) lay between Athens and Mt. Pentelicus.

16. οἶον τετανότριχα: by assimilation for (τοιοῦτον) οἶος τετανόθριξ (ἐστί), lit. "such as a man with long straight hair is."

20. ἥντινα: when a speaker repeats the question of another before answering it, the indirect form of the interrogative pronoun or adverb is regularly used; this may be explained by the ellipsis of ἐρωτᾷς, *e.g.* "(do you ask) what charge (he has brought against me)?" **τὸ γὰρ . . . οὐ φαῦλόν ἐστιν**: νέον ὄντα agrees with the unexpressed subject (τοῦτον) of the infinitive ἐγνωκέναι, and the article τό belongs to the whole accusative and infinitive phrase; lit. "for the fact that he, young as he is, understands so important a matter is not trifling." The perfect ἐγνωκέναι means "to have got to know," "to understand," like Lat. *novisse*.

22. τίνα τρόπον: adverbial accusative. In a dependent question either τίς or ὅστις may be used. **διαφθείρονται**: "are corrupted (morally)."

24. κινδυνεύει: almost equivalent to δοκεῖ or φαίνεται, "he appears." The primary meaning of κινδυνεύω is "to run a risk." **σοφός τις**: cp. 1, 14, *n.* **τὴν ἐμὴν ἀμαθίαν κατιδὼν ὡς διαφθείροντος**: the participle agrees with ἐμοῦ, the genitive of the personal pronoun, implied in the possessive adjective ἐμήν. The use of ὡς indicates that the participle expresses the thought of the subject of the sentence (which may or may not be also the thought of the writer or speaker).

26. **κατηγορήσων μου** : the future participle here expresses purpose. Verbs of accusing compounded with κατά are constructed with a genitive of the person ; the charge, if expressed, would be in the accusative.

27. **τῶν πολιτικῶν**: neuter; the genitive depends on ἄρχεσθαι. **ἄρχεσθαι**: the middle voice is used of beginning an action which is continued by oneself, the active when the action is continued by another; e.g. ἄρχεσθαι τοῦ λόγου, "to begin one's speech," but ἄρχειν τοῦ λόγου, "to begin the conversation."

28. **ὀρθῶς γάρ ἐστι**: the subject of ἐστί is (τὸ) ὀρθῶς (ἄρχεσθαι), the infinitive being supplied from the preceding clause. **τῶν νέων . . . ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως ἔσονται ὅ τι ἄριστοι**: verbs denoting "to take care" are usually constructed with ὅπως and the future indicative; they may also have an objective genitive. Here, as often, the two constructions are combined, lit. "to take care of the young how they shall be as good as possible," i.e. "to take care that the young shall be as good as possible." A substantive which in English is the subject of a dependent clause is frequently in Greek the object of the principal sentence ; cp. οἶδά σε ὅστις εἶ, "I know (thee) who thou art." ὅ τι is adverbial accusative, equivalent to ὡς, and is used with the superlative to denote the highest possible degree.

30. **εἰκός**: sc. ἐστι, "it is natural."

31. **καὶ δὴ καί**: this combination of particles introduces the application of the general statement (ὀρθῶς γάρ . . . ἄριστοι) to the particular case of Meletus.

32. **ἴσως**: "naturally." **τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστας**: "the growth (development) of the young"; or the genitive may be taken as explanatory, "the young shoots, viz. the youths."

33. **ἔπειτα**: this adverb is generally used without δέ in opposition to πρῶτον μέν.

34. **δῆλον ὅτι**: "(it is) clear that." The two words are sometimes written as one and treated as an adverb, "clearly."

35. **ὥς γε τὸ εἰκὸς ξυμβῆναι**: the infinitive is the predicate, but in English the subject and predicate would be inverted, "at least as the result is probable," i.e. "as will probably be the result."

2. 1. **βουλοίμην ἄν**: the potential optative with ἄν makes a mild assertion ; "I could wish (that this were so)."

2. **τοὐναντίον**: crasis for τὸ ἐναντίον. **ἀτεχνῶς**: "without artifice," "literally." Distinguish ἀτέχνως, "without art, "inartistically." **ἀφ' Ἑστίας ἄρχεσθαι**: Hestia (Lat. Vesta) was the goddess of the hearth ; and each city had its public hearth (at Athens it was in the Prytaneium), on which the sacred fire perpetually burned. This was regarded as the central point of the city, and so "to begin at Hestia" is "to begin at the vital part."

3. **κακουργεῖν**: verbs of beginning, e.g. ἄρχεσθαι, are usually constructed with a participle; here the infinitive is preferred because a participle, ἐπιχειρῶν, follows.

4. **καί μοι λέγε**: καί before an imperative may be rendered "pray."

τί καὶ ποιοῦντά σέ φησι διαφθείρειν : τί is the object of ποιοῦντα, Greek often combining an interrogative with a participle. Render, " What can it be that he says you do to corrupt the young ? "

6. ἄτοπα : object of ποιοῦντα understood. ὡς οὕτω γ᾽ ἀκοῦσαι : the infinitive may be used "absolutely," with or without ὡς, to express a limitation. οὕτω is common in the sense of "offhand," "at the first glance." Translate, " His charges are ridiculous, on the first hearing."

8. νομίζοντα : νομίζω means " to have in common use " (e.g. current coin), and hence, as applied to the gods, "to believe in" their existence.

10. ὅτι δή : this clause gives the reason for the statement in the preceding sentence, φησὶ γάρ, κ.τ.λ. τὸ δαιμόνιον : Socrates asserted that from childhood he had intimations given to him by a "divine voice," which never urged him to any course of action, but often held him back. He may have been subject to an hallucination of the sense of hearing, but more probably the expression is purely figurative, and means no more than the voice of conscience.

11. καινοτομοῦντος σου : genitive absolute. The metaphor is from cutting a new road.

15. ὅταν τι λέγω : the subjunctive is used in temporal or relative sentences expressing repeated action in the present or future, ἄν being attached to the adverb of time or relative pronoun. ἐκκλησίᾳ : the Assembly, composed of all Athenian citizens over twenty years of age.

16. τὰ μέλλοντα : "future events."

17. ὧν : by assimilation for τούτων ἅ, where τούτων is partitive genitive depending on οὐδέν.

19. οὐδέν : adverbial accusative with φροντίζειν. ὁμόσε ἰέναι : " to come to close quarters," lit. " to go the same place (as another)." ὁμός in Homer is equivalent to ὁ αὐτός, and the suffix -σε indicates the goal of motion.

3. 1. ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρον, ἀλλά : the usual position for ἀλλά would be before the vocative ; here it is displaced for the sake of emphasis. τὸ μὲν καταγελασθῆναι : there is no corresponding clause introduced by δέ, but this can be easily supplied in thought—" it is not serious to be laughed at (but it is serious to be prosecuted)."

2. οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα : " (is) of no importance."

3. οὐ . . . μέλει, ἄν τινα δεινὸν οἴωνται εἶναι : ἄν (with a long) is of course equivalent to ἐάν (distinguish the particle ἄν, with a short). ἐάν with the subjunctive is regularly used in the protasis of a "general" conditional sentence in primary sequence, i.e. when " if " = " if ever." μὴ μέντοι : the negative is μή because it occurs in the protasis of a conditional sentence.

4. τῆς . . . σοφίας : objective genitive depending on διδασκαλικόν. The meaning of σοφία is "skill" in any department, not necessarily "wisdom." ὃν δ᾽ ἄν . . . οἴωνται : cp. 2, 15, n. The antecedent to ὅν, if expressed, would be τούτῳ (dative depending on θυμοῦνται.

5. **τοιούτους**: *i.e.* δεινούς. This use of τοιοῦτος to avoid the repetition of an adjective is extremely common. **εἴτ᾽ οὖν . . . εἴτε**: alternative conditions are introduced by εἴτε . . . εἴτε (Lat. *sive . . . sive*), the intensive οὖν being often used in one of the clauses with the force of "it may be."

7. **τούτου οὖν πέρι**: τούτου = τοῦ διδασκαλικὸν τῆς σοφίας εἶναι. A dissyllabic preposition (with certain exceptions), when placed after its substantive or pronoun, is accented on the first syllable ; in Attic prose περί is the only preposition that can stand in this position. **ὅπως ποτὲ . . . ἔχουσιν**: an indirect question depending on πειραθῆναι. After interrogative pronouns and adverbs the enclitic ποτέ, "ever," is often used to give vagueness ; *e.g.* τίς ποτε ; "who in the world?" ὅπως ἔχουσιν = "how they are disposed," "what their feelings are " ; for the intransitive use of ἔχω with an adverb, cp. καλῶς ἔχει, "it is well."

9. **σπάνιον σεαυτὸν παρέχειν**: "to show yourself seldom."

10. **οὐκ ἐθέλειν**: the negative with the infinitive, except in indirect speech, is regularly μή. Here, however, οὐκ ἐθέλω is treated as one word, "to be reluctant," and so the negative remains οὐ with all parts of the verb. Similarly οὔ φημι = *nego*, οὐκ ἐῶ = "I forbid."

11. **ὅ τί περ ἔχω**: the force of περ is "*just* whatever I have."

12. **ἄνευ μισθοῦ**: Socrates, unlike the Sophists, would take no fee from his disciples.

13. **προστιθεὶς ἂν ἡδέως**: with προστιθείς supply μισθόν. The present participle with ἄν here represents the present optative with ἄν, for the independent form of the conditional sentence would be προστιθείην ἂν ἡδέως, εἴ τις, κ.τ.λ. "I would gladly pay for the privilege, if any one would listen to me." The participial clause is parallel to the phrase ἄνευ μισθοῦ, "not only without fee, but *prepared to* pay gladly if . . ."

15. **ὥσπερ σὺ φῂς σαυτοῦ**: *sc.* αὐτοὺς καταγελᾶν. **παίζοντας καὶ γελῶντας**: these participles agree with αὐτούς, the unexpressed subject of the infinitive διαγαγεῖν.

16. **εἰ δὲ σπουδάσονται**: εἰ with the future indicative expresses a more vividly realised condition than εἰ with the optative, which was used in the preceding sentence.

17. **τοῦτ᾽ ἤδη ὅπῃ ἀποβήσεται**: an indirect question depending on ἄδηλον (ἐστί). The subject τοῦτο is placed before the interrogative adverb for the sake of emphasis. ἤδη belongs to ἄδηλον (ἐστί) ; its force is " when matters have reached that stage."

20. **κατὰ νοῦν**: "as you think best." **οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμήν**: *sc.* δίκην ἀγωνιεῖσθαι. When the subject of an infinitive is the same as that of the verb on which it depends, it is regularly omitted, unless it is emphatic, in which case it is represented by αὐτός, " self " ; so here we might have expected οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν ἐμήν. Sometimes, however, the accusative is used. καὶ ἐμέ balances σύ τε in the preceding clause ; δέ connects the two clauses.

Ch. 4, 5.—*Euthyphro announces that he is prosecuting his own father for murder, and gives particulars of the case. He insists that the duty of prosecuting is the same whether the victim is a relative or not, and is confident that he is not acting impiously. Socrates thinks that, in view of the charge brought against him by Meletus, he cannot do better than become a pupil of Euthyphro : Meletus must then either drop the prosecution altogether or substitute Euthyphro as defendant. Socrates asks for a definition of holiness and unholiness.*

4. 2. φεύγεις αὐτὴν ἢ διώκεις : φεύγω is the technical term for "to be a defendant," and serves as the passive of διώκω, "to be plaintiff." αὐτήν is accusative of the internal object.

4. τίνα : masculine, accusative of the external object with διώκεις understood.

6. πετόμενόν τινα διώκεις : Socrates is here playing on the technical and the ordinary meaning of διώκω. The proverbial expression τὰ πετόμενα διώκειν answered to our " wild-goose chase."

7. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ πέτεσθαι : " he is far from having wings," lit. " he lacks much to fly." Verbs of lacking are used with a genitive of material. **ὅς γε** : the relative with γε introduces a causal clause, like Lat. *qui* or *quippe qui* with the subjunctive ; translate, " because he . . . "

11. ὦ βέλτιστε : a common mode of address, " my dear sir ! "

12. πάνυ μὲν οὖν : " yes, certainly." οὖν is here intensive.

13. τίνος ἡ δίκη : τίνος is neuter, the genitive with δίκη denoting the subject-matter of the charge (as in the answer, φόνου).

15. Ἡράκλεις : this vocative is often used as an expression of amazement ; originally no doubt it was an appeal to Heracles for help. **ἦ που** : ἦ is the intensive particle, and που is " I suppose."

16. †ὅπη ποτὲ ὀρθῶς ἔχει : if the MSS. reading is right, we must suppose that some words have dropped out, *e.g.* τὸ ἐπεξιέναι φόνου τὸν υἱὸν (cp. **4, 45,** *n.*) πατρί ; for otherwise ὀρθῶς ἔχει has no subject, and there is nothing to which αὐτό in the next sentence can refer.

17. τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος : *sc.* εἶναι ; the genitive is predicative. Translate, " I don't think it is the part of any chance person to do it aright." **πόρρω που ἤδη σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος** : " of some one who is already far advanced in wisdom." σοφίας is partitive genitive depending on the adverbs πόρρω που ; ἐλαύνοντος is used intransitively.

19. μέντοι : this particle has two chief uses, (*a*) asseverative, " certainly," as here, (*b*) adversative, " however," as in **3, 4.**

20. τῶν οἰκείων : the term οἰκεῖος includes household-slaves as well as relatives. In cases of murder, manslaughter, and wounding with intent to kill, Attic law restricted the right of prosecution to the next-of-kin of the victim (or, if he were a slave, to his master). As the man killed was in this case neither Euthyphro's relative nor his slave, it would appear that Euthyphro had no legal status in the case. **ὁ τεθνεὼς ὑπὸ τοῦ σοῦ πατρός** : ἀποθνήσκω serves as the passive of ἀποκτείνω, and is constructed with ὑπό and the genitive expressing the agent. In Attic the perfect is always τέθνηκα, not ἀποτέθνηκα.

21. ἢ δῆλα δή : "of course he must be," lit. "or (is it not) obvious (that he is one of your household)?" ἤ is used, like Latin *an*, to introduce a question which implies the needlessness of a previous question. In a predicate the neuter plural is often used instead of the neuter singular, when the subject (as here) is a clause.

22. ἐπεξήεισθα φόνου αὐτῷ : verbs of accusing and condemning (except those compounded with κατά; cp. 1, 26, *n.*) are constructed with a causal genitive denoting the charge; the person is here expressed by the dative, because the verb is compounded with ἐπί.

24. εἴτε . . . εἴτε : here, and in the next line, these particles introduce the two alternatives of a dependent question (Lat. *utrum* . . . *an*); contrast 3, 5, *n.*

25. ἐν δίκῃ : equivalent to δικαίως, "justifiably."

26. ἐάνπερ : "that is, if . . . ," introducing a limitation.

30. ἐπεί : "(the murdered man was not utterly ἀλλότριος) for . . ." When ἐπεί thus gives the reason for a suppressed clause, its force may often be given by "and yet." πελάτης : a free labourer, not a slave.

31. ἐν τῇ Νάξῳ : Naxos was the largest of the Cyclades, the group of islands in the Aegean. It revolted from the Athenian league (confederacy of Delos) in 472 B.C., but was soon reduced to subjection, and partly occupied by Athenian settlers (κληροῦχοι). At the close of the Peloponnesian war, 404 B.C., all such settlements were given up.

35. τοῦ ἐξηγητοῦ : genitive of source with πευσόμενον. At Athens there were three ἐξηγηταί, "Interpreters," whose functions were to interpret oracles and omens, and to prescribe the means of purification from bloodguiltiness. † ὅ τι χρείη ποιεῖν : the optative may be used in a dependent question when the principal verb (as here πέμπει) is historic present. Some MSS., however, have the indicative χρή.

37. ὡς . . . οὐδὲν ὂν πρᾶγμα : "in the belief that it was of no importance." The accusative absolute is used in the case of the participles of impersonal verbs (*e.g.* ἐξόν), passive participles used impersonally (*e.g.* προστεταγμένον, "orders having been given"), and neuter adjectives or substantives with ὄν. εἰ καὶ ἀποθάνοι : εἰ καί = "although." With this protasis we should expect to have in the apodosis οὐδὲν ἂν ὂν πρᾶγμα (representing οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη πρᾶγμα of the direct form); instead of this we have the more vivid form without ἄν (corresponding to οὐδέν ἐστι πρᾶγμα).

39. πρὶν . . . ἀφικέσθαι : the infinitive is regularly used with πρίν when the principal sentence contains no negative.

40. ταῦτα : adverbial accusative, "therefore," as often in Plato.

43. εἰ ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀπέκτεινεν : lit. "if he had killed him as much as possible," *i.e.* "if it were never so true that he had killed him."

44. οὐ δεῖν : the negative merely repeats οὔτε in l. 43, although normally a simple negative following a compound negative cancels the latter. The infinitive δεῖν is used as though φασίν were the principal verb of the sentence; strictly we should have the participle δέον (accusative absolute), parallel to ἀποκτείναντι. Some editors alter to δέον, and others regard δεῖν as a contracted form of the participle δεῖον (from an assumed form δείω, equal to δέω).

45. ἀνόσιον γὰρ εἶναι : *sc. φασί.* ὑόν : ὑός, not υἱός, seems to have been the usual spelling in Plato's time.

46. τὸ θεῖον ὡς ἔχει : "what is the feeling of the gods."

48. πρὸς Διός : πρός with the genitive is used in entreaties and adjurations.

51. φοβεῖ . . . ὅπως μὴ . . . τυγχάνῃς : verbs of fearing are usually constructed with μή, "lest"; but sometimes ὅπως μή is found, on the analogy of final clauses. δικαζόμενος τῷ πατρί : the active δικάζειν, "to give judgment," is said of the judges ; the middle δικάζεσθαι, "to get judgment given," of the parties to a case.

54. τῳ : equivalent to τινί, dative denoting measure of difference. τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων : genitive of the standard of comparison, depending on διαφέροι.

55. εἰδείην : note the change from the 3rd to the 1st person.

5. 1. ἆρα : this particle is used in questions without implying either an affirmative or a negative answer, but the context here shows that the former is expected.

3. προκαλεῖσθαι : a plaintiff or defendant might "challenge" his opponent to do some particular thing in order to settle a disputed point ; and if the challenge (πρόκλησις) was declined, evidence of the refusal could be given in court with the view of creating a prejudice against the party who declined. αὐτὰ ταῦτα is accusative of the internal object, αὐτόν of the external object. λέγοντα : this agrees with the unexpressed subject (ἐμέ) of the infinitive προκαλεῖσθαι. The dative might have been used, in agreement with μοι in line 1.

4. περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιούμην : "I considered it of great importance." περί originally meant "above," "exceeding."

6. αὐτοσχεδιάζοντα : "speaking unadvisedly."

7. μαθητὴς δὴ γέγονα σός : δή marks the statement as ironical. καὶ εἰ μέν : at this point the indirect statement introduced by ὅτι (l. 4) is dropped, and the quotation of the actual words begins.

9. τὰ τοιαῦτα : accusative of specification with σοφόν. ὀρθῶς νομίζειν : "to be orthodox"; cp. 2, 8, n.

10. λάχε δίκην : λαγχάνειν δίκην is practically "to bring an action" ; for the order in which cases should come on was decided by lots drawn by the several plaintiffs.

15. λέγειν : the infinitive depends on κράτιστόν ἐστι in l. 1.

16. εἰ ἄρα : ἄρα implies that the supposition is improbable.

17. ὅπῃ σαθρός ἐστιν : "where his weak point lies." σαθρός is a metaphor from unsound meat.

18. πολύ : adverbial accusative with πρότερον. ἂν ἐγένετο : note the change in the form of the apodosis from the optative with ἄν to the aorist indicative with ἄν. The latter implies the protasis εἰ ἐπεχείρησε, "if he had attempted" (implying "he has not attempted").

22. ὁ Μέλητος οὗτος : "this creature Meletus," οὗτος being used contemptuously.

23. ἀσεβείας : the genitive depends on γραφήν understood.

25. ποῖόν τι : when a speaker seriously wants a definition, ποῖός τις

is used; ποῖος alone is used in ironical questions. εὐσεβές: here synonymous with ὅσιον, though strictly ὅσιον refers to pious feeling and εὐσεβές to pious action.

27. ταὐτόν . . . αὐτὸ αὑτῷ: "identical," lit. "itself the same as itself," αὑτῷ being dative of resemblance with ταὐτόν. αὐτός is constantly used beside the reflexive pronoun for the sake of emphasis.

28. †τοῦ μὲν ὁσίου παντὸς ἐναντίον: "the opposite of all that is holy." A conjectural reading is πᾶν τοὐναντίον, "quite the opposite of what is holy."

29. ἰδέαν: "form" or "nature" or "character." The word is not used here in the special sense which it bears in Plato's later works (Introduction, p. 6). †κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα: "in virtue of its unholiness." Another reading is κατὰ τὴν ὁσιότητα, "like holiness."

30. πᾶν, ὅ τί περ ἂν μέλλῃ ἀνόσιον εἶναι: this is practically a repetition of the subject τὸ ἀνόσιον.

Ch. 6, 7.—*First definition:* "*Holiness is to do as I am doing, i.e. to prosecute for murder, sacrilege, etc., irrespective of relationship to the offender.*" *This is supported by the conduct of Zeus and Cronus to their respective parents. Socrates does not believe such tales about the gods (hence his prosecution); Euthyphro proclaims his belief in them and is eager to enlighten Socrates, but is recalled to the task of definition. As yet he has only enumerated several instances of pious conduct. He now gives his second definition:* "*Holiness is what the gods love, unholiness what they do not love.*"

6. 5. ἐξαμαρτάνοντι: this participle is subordinate to ἀδικοῦντι; lit. "him who does wrong by offending either in a matter of bloodshed, etc."

6. ἐάν τε . . . ἐάν τε: these particles are used with the subjunctive in stating alternative conditions, in the same way as εἴτε . . . εἴτε with the indicative or optative; cp. **3,** 5, *n.*

7. ὁστισοῦν: "anyone whosoever." The addition of -οῦν converts the relative into an indefinite pronoun.

9. τοῦ νόμου: these words are put by anticipation in the principal sentence in dependence on τεκμήριον, instead of ὁ νόμος being subject of οὕτως ἔχει. ὃ καὶ ἄλλοις . . . γιγνόμενα: these clauses are parenthetical, and μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν in l. 10 is explanatory of οὕτως.

10. ὀρθῶς: to be joined with γιγνόμενα, lit. "these matters would in this way be taking place properly."

11. αὐτοί: *i.e.* of their own accord, apart from the teaching of experts.

12. γάρ: used, like Lat. *enim*, to introduce a narrative.

14. τὸν αὑτοῦ πατέρα δῆσαι: Cronus, the father of Zeus, knowing that he would be destroyed by one of his own children, swallowed the five eldest of his offspring (Hestia, Demeter, Hera, Hades, and Poseidon), but was deceived in the case of Zeus, the sixth; for a stone wrapped in swaddling clothes was given to him in place of the babe.

When Zeus grew up, he wrested the sovereignty of heaven from Cronus and imprisoned him in Tartarus. κατέπινεν : this compound is used of gulping down solids as well as liquids. The imperfect implies repeated action.

15. κἀκεῖνόν γε . . . ἐκτεμεῖν : Uranus concealed his offspring by Gaea in hollows of the earth as fast as they were born ; but the youngest of them, Cronus, disabled his father and reigned in his stead.

19. τοῦτο : pointing forward to the clause ὅτι . . . ἀποδέχομαι.

21. δυσχερῶς πως : πως modifies the adverb just as τις modifies an adjective ; cp. νέος τις, 1, 14, n. διό : this refers to the clause τὰ τοιαῦτα . . . ἀποδέχομαι.

24. ἡμῖν : i.e. myself and others like me.

25. αὐτοί : to be joined with εἰδέναι, in the sense of "by ourselves," i.e. without instruction from experts. ὁμολογοῦμεν . . . μηδὲν εἰδέναι : the negative with the infinitive in an indirect statement is regularly οὐ ; but when the principal verb denotes hoping, promising, swearing, agreeing, etc., μή is preferred.

26. πρὸς φιλίου : sc. Διός ; Zeus was the god of friendship. ὡς ἀληθῶς : practically equivalent to ἀληθῶς, and perhaps used on the analogy of ὡς αὔτως, the adverbial form corresponding to ὁ αὐτός.

28. καὶ . . . γε : γε indicates assent, and καί adds a fresh point.

30. πόλεμον . . . ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς : instances of this were the struggle of Zeus and his brethren against Cronus and the Titans, and the part taken by the gods in the Trojan war. τῷ ὄντι : dative of manner, "in reality."

33. ποιητῶν : e.g. Homer and Hesiod. καὶ ὑπὸ . . . καταπεποίκιλται : there is here a change of construction, for we should have expected καὶ γράφεται ὑπὸ τῶν . . . γραφέων. A new subject is introduced, viz. τὰ ἄλλα ἱερά, "the temples besides," ἄλλα meaning "as well as the sacred robe," mentioned in the next clause. With καταπεποίκιλται supply the internal accusative τοιαῦτα.

34. καὶ δὴ καί : introducing a climax, "and above all." τοῖς μεγάλοις Παναθηναίοις : the (local) dative without a preposition may denote "time when" in the case of names of festivals. There were two Athenian festivals, called Παναθήναια, in honour of the goddess Athena ; one, τὰ μεγάλα, took place once in four years ; the other τὰ μικρά, was held annually.

35. ὁ πέπλος : this was a splendid robe woven by the maidens of Athens and embroidered with mythological subjects ; it was carried in procession at the Great Panathenaea, and offered at the image of Athena Polias in the Erechtheium on the Acropolis.

37. φῶμεν : deliberative subjunctive.

38. μὴ μόνον γε : sc. ταῦτα φῶμεν (jussive subjunctive).

7. 8. ἀλλὰ γάρ : "but as a matter of fact." γάρ is a compound of γε and ἄρα, and in this phrase the force of γε predominates.

13. εἶδος : practically equivalent to ἰδέα ; cp. 5, 29, n. ᾧ : causal dative.

16. ἔγωγε: the emphatic form of the pronoun is frequently used to express assent.

18. εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων: "keeping it constantly in view."

19. τοιοῦτον: i.e. resembling the ἰδέα. ὧν: by assimilation for τούτων ἅ, where τούτων is partitive genitive depending on ὅ in the preceding clause.

28. εἰ μέντοι ἀληθῶς: sc. ἀπεκρίνω.

29. ἐπεκδιδάξεις: "will go on (ἐπι-) to explain fully (ἐκ-)."

Ch. 8-10.—*Socrates shows that if the gods quarrel among themselves, as Euthyphro says they do, it must be about questions of morality. Therefore the same act will be loved by some gods and hated by others. Consequently holiness and unholiness are sometimes identical. Euthyphro, however, thinks that all gods are agreed that the wrongdoer ought to be punished. Quite so, says Socrates; men, too, are agreed on that point; but disputes arise as to whether a particular act is wrong. What reason is there, he asks, for believing that all gods think Euthyphro's action just and his father's unjust? Euthyphro declines to answer.*

8. 1. φέρε: imperative used as exclamation, "come!" τί λέγομεν: "what we mean." τὸ μὲν θεοφιλές τε: sc. ὅσιόν ἐστι. Note that τε is put slightly out of its proper place, because it cannot stand next to μέν.

2. τὸ δὲ θεομισές: this is substituted for τὸ δὲ μὴ προσφιλές (7, 26), it being assumed that the gods hate whatever they do not love.

8. δοκῶ: "I think so," like the impersonal δοκεῖ μοι.

9. οὐκοῦν: this particle is equivalent to οὖν, the negative force which remains in οὔκουν having disappeared in οὐκοῦν.

13. ὀργάς: the plural denotes "exhibitions of anger."

14. ἆρ' ἄν: ἄν belongs to ποιοῖ in l. 16. This particle is often put near the beginning of a sentence and afterwards repeated in the neighbourhood of the verb.

15. ὁπότερα πλείω: sc. εἴη, "as to which of two sets of things was the more numerous." The clause is a dependent question.

16. ποιοῖ: the commoner form in Attic is ποιοίη. The verb is here constructed, (1) with a complementary adjective, ἐχθρούς, (2) with an infinitive, ὀργίζεσθαι.

20. περὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος: "on a question of size." Plato often omits the article with the second of two adjectives or substantives even when they refer to different things.

24. ἱστάναι: "to weigh," lit. "to place (in the balance)."

27. πῶς γὰρ οὔ: "of course," lit. "why not?"

28. †ἐπί τινα κρίσιν: "at any decision." Most editors read ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν in the sense of "to decision about what."

30. ἐμοῦ λέγοντος: genitive absolute.

35. ὅταν γιγνώμεθα: sc. ἐχθροί; this limiting clause is inserted because difference of opinion does not *necessarily* produce enmity.

37. ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ διαφορά : the presence of the article shows that ἡ διαφορά is subject and αὕτη predicate.

39. τί δέ : introducing a new point, like Lat. *quid ?* Translate, "once more."

41. πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ; a common formula of assent, "undoubtedly."

42. τῶν θεῶν : partitive genitive depending on ἄλλοι. ἄλλοι ἄλλα δίκαια ἡγοῦνται : "some think one thing just, others think another thing just," *i.e.* "different gods think different things just."

48. ἕκαστοι ; the force of the plural is "each *party* of gods."

56. ταῦτ' : *i.e.* ταὐτά (crasis for τὰ αὐτά). When the final vowel is elided, its accent is thown on the preceding syllable.

60. τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ : "on that theory."

9. 1. ὃ ἡρόμην : in **6**, 1, Socrates asked for a definition of holiness and of unholiness. Instead of giving this, Euthyphro has mentioned things which are both holy and unholy.

2. †ὃ τυγχάνει ταὐτὸν ὄν, κ.τ.λ. : ὄν belongs both to τυγχάνει and to ταὐτόν, "which, while remaining the same, is both holy and unholy." For ὅ the dative ᾧ has been suggested, τοῦτο then meaning "that theory according to which the same thing is both holy and unholy."

4. ὅ : the antecedent is τοῦτο in the next line.

5. οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν : *sc.* ἂν εἴη. οὐδέν is adverbial accusative. Διὶ . . . Κρόνῳ . . . Οὐρανῷ : cp. **6**, 14 and 15, *n.*

7. Ἡφαίστῳ . . . Ἥρᾳ : Hephaestus (identified by the Romans with *Vulcanus*) was the god of fire and of the arts, *e.g.* metal-working, in which fire is employed. According to one legend, his mother Hera (*Juno*) hated him because he was born lame, and hurled him from Olympus into the sea, where he was taken care of by two nymphs. At last he revenged himself by sending to his mother a golden chair so constructed that when she had once sat down on it she was held fast and could not rise.

8. ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ : ἕτερος is redundant; cp. **5**, 27, *n.* Similarly ἕτερον, l. 11.

9. καὶ ἐκείνοις : *sc.* ἢ φίλον ἢ ἐχθρόν.

11. ὡς οὐ δεῖ : the negative in the dependent clause merely repeats the negative idea involved in the verb (διαφέρεσθαι) on which it depends. It must not be rendered in English. The same construction occurs with ἀμφισβητοῦντος in ll. 14, 15, and it is common with ἀπαρνοῦμαι, "to deny." Often instead of ὡς or ὅτι with οὐ and a finite verb the infinitive occurs with the negative μή.

13. ἤδη τινὸς ἤκουσας ἀμφισβητοῦντος : ἀκούω with the genitive and participle means to hear something with one's own ears ; with the accusative and participle, to learn it by report.

15. ἄλλο ἀδίκως ποιοῦντα : here the present participle is used, although the aorist ἀποκτείναντι has just preceded. The reason is that ἀδίκως ποιῶ, like ἀδικῶ, denotes the state of being ἄδικος, "I am a wrongdoer," which is the result of having done an unjust act.

16. μὲν οὖν : this combination of particles introduces a modification

or correction of a previous statement; translate, "nay rather." But in πάνυ μὲν οὖν each of the particles has an intensive force.

17. δικαστηρίοις: "jury-courts." All criminal trials at Athens took place before juries much larger than ours; *e.g.* at the trial of Socrates the jury numbered 501.

18. πάντα ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι: "they do and say *anything*." φεύγοντες: the present here denotes attempted action; cp. δίδωμι, "I offer," πείθω, "I urge," "try to persuade."

21. ὁμολογοῦντες: the participle makes a concession.

25. δοτέον δίκην: with the verbal adjective in -έος two constructions are admissible; (*a*) as here, the neuter singular of the adjective may govern the same case as the verb from which it is formed; (*b*) the adjective may agree with the substantive, *e.g.* δοτέα δίκη.

30. τὸ τίς ἐστιν . . . πότε: the article goes with the whole clause, which is treated as a substantive. With πότε supply δρῶν.

32. αὐτά γε ταῦτα . . . πεπόνθασιν: "are in the very same position."

34. †ἀλλήλους: with this, the MSS. reading, the clause means "some say that they are wronging one another." Some editors read ἄλλους.

36. τῷ γε ἀδικοῦντι: the agent with the verbal adjective in -τέος is regularly expressed by the dative.

38. τὸ κεφάλαιον: adverbial accusative, "in the main."

10. 1. ἴθι: like ἄγε, "come!" νυν: inferential, "then" or "therefore." Distinguish νῦν, "at the present time."

5. φθάσῃ τελευτήσας . . . πρὶν . . . πυθέσθαι: "dies before his captor learns." φθάνω, "to be beforehand," is regularly constructed with a participle, and is often used before πρίν to emphasize the notion of priority.

8. ἐπισκήπτεσθαι: usually this verb means "to take proceedings" against a witness for perjury; but occasionally it is used, as here, of other crimes.

10. παντὸς μᾶλλον: "undoubtedly," lit. "rather than anything." The phrase arose in such a sentence as "you ought to do this rather than anything else," *i.e.* "you ought undoubtedly to do this."

12. ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ: ἐπί with the dative here expresses cause.

14. ἐπεί: "though"; cp. **4**, 30, *n.*

15. ὅτι σοι δοκῶ: this clause gives the reason, not for the statement μανθάνω, but for Euthyphro's assertion οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔργον ἐστίν.

17. ἄδικά τέ ἐστιν: *sc.* τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρός σου πεπραγμένα.

Ch. 11-13.—*Socrates waives his question, and suggests a modification of the definition: " What the gods love is holy; what some love and others hate is neither or both." This leads Euthyphro to state his third definition: " Holiness is what all gods love, what they all hate is unholy." Socrates shows that the terms " holy" and " loved-by-gods" are not convertible; for (a) holiness is loved by the gods because it is holy, but (b)*

*what is loved-by-gods is loved-by-gods because they love it.   Moreover,
Euthyphro has mentioned an attribute of holiness instead of giving a defi-
nition.   Euthyphro complaining that Socrates will not let his statements
alone, Socrates suggests that " Whatever is holy is right, but not all that
is right is holy."   The import of this is made clear by an example.*

11. 2. τόδε: this is explained by the following sentence εἰ . . . ἀνόσιον.
σου . . . λέγοντος: genitive absolute.

3. εἰ ὅ τι μάλιστα : cp. **4**, 43, *n.*

5. τί : adverbial accusative with μᾶλλον.

7. τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον : "this particular act," *i.e.* the homicide com-
mitted by Euthyphro's father; similarly αὐτό in l. 9.   ἀλλὰ γάρ,
κ.τ.λ. : "but as a matter of fact we saw just now that this is not
the criterion of holiness and unholiness."   τούτῳ is dative of instrument
with ὡρισμένα, lit. "marked off by this," and may refer either to
τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον or to θεομισές.   If to the former, ἐφάνη ἄρτι ("were
shown just now") alludes to the discussion in Ch. 7 of Euthyphro's
first definition;   then the next clause (τὸ γὰρ θεομισὲς . . . ἐφάνη)
must be an interpolation, because it alludes to the criticism (in **8**, 57)
of the *second* definition.   On the other hand, if τούτῳ refers to θεομισές,
the two clauses ἀλλὰ γάρ . . . τὸ ὅσιον καὶ μή and τὸ γὰρ . . . ἐφάνη
are consistent with one another (both alluding to the criticism of the
second definition) ; but they are both irrelevant, for Socrates has just
expressed his willingness to assume that *all* the gods hate this
particular act ;   consequently they must both be rejected as in-
terpolations.

12. ἐπανορθώμεθα : deliberative subjunctive.

14. οὐδέτερα ἢ ἀμφότερα : "(is) neither or both."   Strict grammar
would require οὐδέτερον, but the plural is used for the sake of
symmetry with ἀμφότερα.   The addition of ἢ ἀμφότερα is illogical, for
a thing cannot be both holy and unholy.

18. τὸ σόν : " your own affair."

19. τοῦτο ὑποθέμενος : "laying down this principle."   οὕτω : " in
that way," referring to the participle preceding.

25. ἐῶμεν : "are we to let it alone," *i.e.* " are we to be content
with it?"   οὕτως : "just as it stands," *i.e.* "without further ex-
amination."

12. 6. λέγομέν τι φερόμενον : " we speak of a thing as being
carried."

8. ᾗ : adverb, "the respect in which."

20. τοὐναντίον : accusative in apposition with the sentence, " on
the contrary."

24. ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν : " what I mean."

25. εἴ τι γίγνεται ἢ τι πάσχει : the first τι is nominative, the
second is accusative ; " if anything becomes, or is affected in any way."

31. ἢ πάσχον τι ὑπό του : πάσχω is constructed with ὑπό and the
genitive because it is virtually a passive verb.   του = τινός.

33. τοῦτο : *i.e.* τὸ φιλούμενον.

34. ὑπὸ ὧν : the suppressed antecedent is ὑπὸ τούτων.

38. ἄλλο τι φιλεῖται: "is it not loved?" The use of ἄλλο τι or ἄλλο τι ἤ as an equivalent of ἆρα οὐ (Lat. *nonne*) originates in such a sentence as ἄλλο τι ποιεῖς ἢ θαυμάζεις; lit. "do you do anything else than wonder?" *i.e.* "do you not wonder?"

46. †τὸ θεοφιλές: these words are not in any MS., but are essential to the argument. They form the subject both of φιλεῖται and of ἐστι.

13. 2. αὐτῷ τούτῳ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι: causal dative.

5. εἴ γε ταὐτὸν ἦν, κ.τ.λ.: this long conditional sentence starts with a protasis in the imperfect indicative, implying that the condition is not fulfilled—"if what is dear to the gods and what is holy were identical (but they are not)." Subordinate to this main protasis are two others, introduced respectively by εἰ μέν and εἰ δέ; and each of these has an apodosis introduced by καί ("also"). Note however that, although the imperfect indicative is used in these subordinate protases, the condition in each case is as a matter of fact fulfilled. The form of the main protasis determines the form of those subordinate to it.

10. νῦν δέ: "but as it is," "but as a matter of fact."

11. τὸ μέν: *i.e.* τὸ θεοφιλές, opposed to τὸ δέ, *i.e.* τὸ ὅσιον.

12. οἷον φιλεῖσθαι: "such a thing as to be loved."

15. πάθος: "attribute" or "property." This term is explained by the clause ὅ τι πέπονθε τὸ ὅσιον, and the accusative ὅ τι in turn is explained by the infinitive φιλεῖσθαι.

17. ὅ τι δὲ ὄν: *sc.* φιλεῖται, lit. "*being what* it is loved," *i.e.* "what is the essence of which being loved is an attribute." εἰ . . . σοι φίλον: "if you please."

18. μή με ἀποκρύψῃ: ἀποκρύπτομαι may be constructed with an accusative of the person from whom a thing is concealed.

19. εἴτε . . . εἴτε: "either . . . or," implying that it does not matter which supposition is true. ὁτιδή: "anything whatsoever." The addition of δή or οὖν converts a relative into an indefinite pronoun.

23. εἴπω: deliberative subjunctive in a dependent question.

27. Δαιδάλου: possessive genitive forming the predicate to ἔοικεν εἶναι, "seem to be the work of Daedalus." This mythical artist was said to have made statues that could move. He was regarded as the ancestor of all sculptors; so that Socrates, the son of a sculptor, here calls him πρόγονος.

29. ἄρα: indicating surprise, "after all." τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα: "the products of my argument." ἔργα is often used of works of art.

31. νῦν δὲ σαὶ γὰρ . . . εἰσίν: "but, as a matter of fact, the definitions are really your own." γάρ is a compound of γε and ἄρα, and in this phrase the force of γε predominates. Others suppose an ellipsis, and give γάρ its ordinary sense—"but in fact (it is not so), for, etc."

32. σοί: the pronoun is accented because it is emphatic, "for you (not for me)."

34. σχεδόν τι : "pretty nearly."

36. τούτοις : the dative depends on ἐντιθείς. τοῦτο : in agreement with τὸ περιιέναι.

37. ἐμοῦ γε ἕνεκα : "as far as I am concerned."

39. ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός : "that great man" ; cp. Lat. ille.

40. τοσούτῳ : dative of measure of difference with δεινότερος. After ὅσῳ a comparative adjective would be expected, but the form of the sentence is suddenly changed. The logical form of expression would be, "I am as much cleverer than Daedalus as a man who makes other people's productions move is cleverer than a man who makes only his own productions move." Translate τοσούτῳ ὅσῳ, "in so far as."

42. τῆς τέχνης : partitive genitive depending on τοῦτο.

43. σοφός : "clever," as an artist is. ἐβουλόμην ἄν : the potential imperfect indicative with ἄν refers either to a present act or to a continued action in the past ; "I could wish (now)," or "I could have wished."

45. τὰ Ταντάλου χρήματα : Tantalus, a mythical king of Lydia, was proverbial for his wealth.

47. τρυφᾶν : "to stand on your dignity." †αὐτός . . . διδάξῃς : with this, the MSS. reading, δεῖξαι lacks an object—"I will help you myself to show . . . in order that you may instruct me." In order to get an object-clause, some editors read διδάξαις, "to show how you might instruct me." But it is better to omit δεῖξαι and retain διδάξῃς. ὅπως ἄν with the subjunctive in a final clause is practically equivalent to ὅπως or ἵνα ; but originally the ἄν would imply a suppressed conditional clause ; as here, "in order that (if I do so) you may instruct me."

49. ἰδὲ γὰρ εἰ οὐκ . . . δοκεῖ : in a dependent question εἰ = Lat. num, and the negative of the direct question is retained. δίκαιον : throughout this passage the word has the wide meaning of "morally right," not the specific meaning of "just."

54. τὸ δέ τι καὶ ἄλλο : "and the rest, whatever it is, different?" τι gives indefiniteness to τὸ δέ.

55. ἕπομαι : Euthyphro uses this word figuratively, of following with one's understanding ; but Socrates applies it literally when he says that Euthyphro, being a younger man, ought to be able to "keep up" with him.

56. καὶ μήν : here adversative, like καίτοι, "and yet." οὐκ ἐλάττονι ἤ : practically the same as τοσούτῳ.

57. ὃ λέγω : an idiomatic use of the present tense to refer to a previous statement.

60. ὁ ποιητὴς ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιήσας : with the use of ποιέω and ποιητής, cp. the Old English "maker" in the sense of "poet." The equotation which follows is taken from the Cypria, an epic poem (not extant) which started with the first cause of the Trojan war and described events prior to those narrated in Homer's Iliad. The poem was ascribed to various authors, e.g. Stasinus of Cyprus.

61. Ζῆνα : a poetical form for Δία. ἔρξαντα : aorist participle of ἔρδω.

63. ἵνα : in the local sense, "where"; and similarly throughout this passage.

69. μηδέν : adverbial accusative.

72. δέος εἶναι : sc. δοκεῖ μοι.

74. πεφόβηται : the perfect denotes the present state, "is afraid," resulting from a past act, "has been frightened."

78. ἐπὶ πλέον : "(is) more widely applicable."

79. περιττόν : "odd," opposed to ἄρτιον, "even."

83. τὸ τοιοῦτον . . . λέγων : "meaning something like that." καὶ ἐκεῖ : "there also," viz. in 13, 52-54.

Ch. 14-16.—*The question remains, What part of right conduct is holiness? Fourth definition : "Holiness is that part of justice which is concerned with care for the gods." An examination of the meaning of "care" shows that the care here meant is not the care which improves those on whom it is bestowed (e.g. the care of a man for a horse), but "service" like that of a slave to his master. The analogy of the trades shows that such service ministers to the production of some result. What then is the result produced by the gods? Euthyphro avoids answering, and states his fifth definition : "Holiness is the knowledge of how to pray and sacrifice to the gods."*

14, 2. τὸ ποῖον μέρος : the article is used with ποῖος when it asks for further definition of something that has been already mentioned.

3. εἰ ἠρώτας . . . εἶπον ἄν : the imperfect indicative in the protasis here, as often, refers to present time ; and so does the aorist indicative with ἄν in the apodosis. This use is abnormal, but occurs in several passages of Plato. The force of the aorist seems to be, "I should at once say," whereas the imperfect would imply duration, "I should be saying."

4. οἷον : "for instance."

5. οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμός : *i.e.* τὸ ἄρτιον.

6. σκαληνὸς . . . ἰσοσκελής : numbers are here spoken of in geometrical terminology.

10. λέγωμεν : "tell," in the sense of "bid." Accordingly the negative with the dependent infinitives is μή.

15. 5. λέγομεν γάρ που—οἷόν φαμεν : the construction is broken at που. The sentence begins as though Socrates was going to indicate in general terms how care for gods differs from care for men ; instead of doing this, he gives particular instances, introduced by οἷον, "for example."

16. βοῶν : sc. θεραπεία ἐστί ; similarly with ὁσιότης τε καὶ εὐσέβεια in l. 18.

22. ἐπ᾽ ἀγαθῷ τινί ἐστι : "does it aim at some benefit?" ἐπί with the dative often denotes purpose ; cp. ἐπὶ βλάβῃ, l. 29.

28. ὡς αὕτως : also written ὡσαύτως.

40. πολλοῦ καὶ δέω : "far from it," lit. "I lack much," *i.e.* I come far short (of thinking that you mean that).

41. οὐχ ἡγούμενος . . . λέγειν : this is practically a repetition of the words τούτου δὴ ἕνεκα.

45. εἶεν : "very well," "be it so." The word is connected with the exclamation εἶα, not with the verb εἰμί.

47. †ἥνπερ : cognate accusative. Some MSS. have the dative ᾗπερ.

49. θεοῖς : the dative depends on ὑπηρετική, an adjective taking the same construction as the verb ὑπηρετέω.

16. 1. ἡ ἰατροῖς ὑπηρετική : "the service that ministers to doctors," *i.e.* the medicines that they use.

2. ἔργου : "result."

3. εἰς ὑγιείας : *sc.* ἀπεργασίαν. Similarly with εἰς πλοῖον and εἰς οἰκίας in ll. 7, 8.

19. τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν : "their chief result."

24. αὐτῶν : the genitive depends on ἀπεργασίας.

27. τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν : partitive genitive depending on τί, "out of the many fine results which the gods produce, what is the chief result of their working?"

29. ὀλίγον . . . πρότερον : the degree of difference with a comparative may be expressed either by the accusative or by the dative of the words ὀλίγον and πολύ.

30. πλείονος ἔργου ἐστίν : "it is a matter of considerable difficulty." ἔργου is genitive of quality used predicatively ; πλείονος is the comparative used absolutely, "more (than ordinary)."

31. ἁπλῶς : "simply," *i.e.* without going into details.

34. τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πόλεων : "commonwealths."

Ch. 17-20.—*Socrates shows that holiness, according to this definition, is the knowledge of how to ask from the gods and give to them ; consequently it is a kind of trading, in which the benefit is all on man's side. It is acceptable, but not profitable to or loved by the gods. Euthyphro blurts out that they do love it, thereby harking back to his already discredited definition, "Holiness is what is dear to the gods." Socrates wishes to make a fresh start, but Euthyphro remembers that he has an engagement.*

17. 1. πολύ : adverbial accusative with βραχυτέρων.

3. ἀλλὰ γάρ : cp. **7, 8,** *n.* δῆλος εἶ : Greek prefers the personal form of expression ; but we should say, "it is plain."

4. ἐπειδὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἦσθα : "when you were close upon it," *i.e.* the answer to my question. ὃ εἰ ἀπεκρίνω : "but if you had given that answer." ὃ = τοῦτο δέ.

5. ἄν . . . ἐμεμαθήκη : the force of the pluperfect is, "I should have been in possession of information."

6. νῦν δὲ . . . γάρ : cp. **13, 31,** *n.* †τὸν ἐρωτῶντα τῷ ἐρωτωμένῳ : the MSS. read τὸν ἐρῶντα (or ἐρωτῶντα) τῷ ἐρωμένῳ. Plato often

speaks of the relation between teacher and pupil as similar to that between the lover and the object of his affections.

7. ὑπάγῃ : the force of ὑπό in composition is often "gradually."

14. αἰτήσεως καὶ δόσεως θεοῖς : after αἰτήσεως supply παρὰ θεῶν. δόσις takes the dative, on the analogy of δίδωμι.

18. χαμαὶ πεσεῖται : metaphorical for "will come to nought."

20. αὐτοὺς . . . ἐκείνοις : both pronouns refer to the gods.

18. 3. ἀλλὰ τί : "of course," lit. "why, what (else could it be)?"

6. τεχνικόν : "workmanlike," *i.e.* appropriate in one who has mastered the craft in question.

14. ὧν : the relative is assimilated to the case of the antecedent. ἃ . . . διδόασιν : the clause is an indirect question, depending on δῆλον (ἐστί). The relative ὅς is occasionally used in such clauses instead of the interrogative τίς or ὅστις.

16. ἃ : supply as antecedent ἀπὸ τούτων.

23. τί δήποτε : τί shows that Socrates is asking for a definition of the gifts, instead of which Euthyphro mentions particular instances of gifts.

28. οὐχὶ ὠφέλιμον οὐδὲ φίλον : Socrates assumes that what is ὠφέλιμον is also φίλον.

30. τοῦτο : this refers to the phrase τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον. αὖ : "once more"; τὸ ὅσιον had been already defined thus in 7, 25.

19. 3. ἐμὲ . . . τὸν Δαίδαλον : "me, whom you call Daedalus." Socrates is referring to Euthyphro's words in **13**, 37.

5. καὶ . . . ποιῶν : καί introduces the explanation of the particular feature in which Euthyphro surpasses Daedalus. κύκλῳ περιιόντας : the figures of Daedalus merely moved about, but Euthyphro's arguments move in a circle. Some MSS. have περιόντας ; the possibility of the elision of the ι of περί in this compound of εἶμι is proved by the metre in some passages of Aristophanes.

7. ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν : the reference is to **13**, 5-13.

12. ἄλλο τι ἤ : this expression has here lost its usual force (=*nonne*; cp. **12**, 38, *n.*), and is equivalent to "I suppose." γίγνεται : "turns out to be."

20. 2. ἑκὼν εἶναι : "if I can help it," lit. "so far as being willing goes." Attic writers use the expression only in negative sentences.

5. οἶσθα γάρ, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων : "you know, if any one else does," *i.e.* "you know better than anyone else."

6. ὥσπερ ὁ Πρωτεύς : the sea-god Proteus could change himself into any shape at will ; but in spite of this he was overpowered by Menelaus, king of Sparta, on his way home from the Trojan war, in the island of Pharos off the coast of Egypt. Proteus then revealed to Menelaus the destinies of the Greek chieftains.

8. οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως : "it is impossible that . . . " lit. "there is no way how . . . " ἀνδρὸς θητὸς ἄνδρα πρεσβύτην : ἀνήρ is often

prefixed to substantives which denote a person's rank or condition in life.

9. **διωκάθειν** : a lengthened form of διώκειν ; cp. εἰκάθειν for εἴκειν, and ἀμυνάθειν for ἀμύνειν. These forms are sometimes explained as aorists, and accented διωκαθεῖν, κ.τ.λ.

10. **τοὺς θεοὺς ἂν ἔδεισας παρακινδυνεύειν**: the verb of fearing has here a threefold construction : (*a*) accusative of the direct object, (*b*) an infinitive, (*c*) a dependent clause introduced by μή. "You would have feared the gods, (feared) to run a risk, (and feared) lest . . . " **μὴ . . . ποιήσοις**: the future optative is very rarely used in a clause dependent on a verb of fearing in a historic tense (as here, ἂν ἔδεισας) ; similarly the future indicative is occasionally found when the principal verb is in a primary tense. The normal construction here would be the present or aorist optative or subjunctive.

15. **σπεύδω ποι** : " I am in a hurry (to get) somewhere."

17. **οἷα ποιεῖς** : exclamatory, " what treatment this is ! "

18. **ὡς . . . ἀπαλλάξομαι** : this clause is explanatory of ἐλπίδος. The second καί in l. 19 is "also."

22. **καὶ δὴ καί** : " and above all " ; cp. **6**, 34.

23. **ὅτι . . . βιωσοίμην** : this clause, like the two preceding, probably depends on ἐνδειξάμενος ; it may also be taken as parallel to the clause ὡς . . . ἀπαλλάξομαι and depending on the words ἐλπίδος . . . ἣν εἶχον. The future optative in indirect speech depending on a historic tense corresponds to the future indicative of the direct form ; but the indicative may always be retained (hence ἀπαλλάξομαι.)